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incarceration without bail of a juvenile upon a finding that unless
detained, there is a serious risk that he will do an act which, if
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committed by an adult, would constitute a crime under state law.
Appnts argue the CA2 erred when it struck down the scheme as violative
of procedural due process.

Appnts in No. 82-1278 also argue that in

this~lass action habeas corpus suit the CA erred in mandating the
release from preventive detention of accused juvenile delinquents who
were ordered detained in the time period between the granting of the
writ by the DC and its affirmance on appeal.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Appees are a class

consisting of "all juveniles who are now being held or will be held
before these proceedings are concluded, in 'p°'retrial detention" in New
York City.

Appnt in No. 82-1248 is the Commissioner of the New York

City Department of Juvenile Justice, and in No. 82-1278 appnt is the
Attorney General of the State of New York, who intervened below to
;

defend the constitutionality of the state statute at issue.
New York ~tate juvenile proceeding~ work as follows: a
proceeding is initi~ed by~

~ tn f ~r delinquency, which alleges 1)

....

that the youth did an act which, if done by an adult, would constitute
a crime (giving the particulars of the act}, 2) that the youth was
under 16 years of age at the time of the act, and 3) that the youth
re ~

for

supervision, treatment, or confinement.

act-findin

conclusion of wh ~
petn is dismissed~

The case then goes

hearing before av;,amily Court judge,

fan

the

/~:

e youth either is adjudged a delinquent or the
delinquency c!J.djudicated at the fact-finding,

a probation investigation precedes a dispositional hearing, at which
the judge may choose from a number of alternatives, including
suspension of judgment, probation, placement at home or with other
indi~iduals, or at a facility for treat~ent, or "restrictive

-
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placement," which is incarceration.

Often, the limits on resources

leave judges with no actual options except probation or incarceration.
The statutory criteria for determining the appropriate disposition are
the needs and best interests of the juvenile, the character of the
offense and the need for protection of the community.
V

It

The challenged provision governs an intermediate step.
Section 739(a) (ii) of the New York Family Court Act authorizes

detention of a juvenile after the filing of a petn, but before fact-

...-

finding, when a Family Court judge finds

and states the facts and

reasons for so finding -- that "there is a serious risk that [the
juvenile] may before the return date do an act which if committed by
an adult would constitute a crime. 111

The potential crimes are not

limited to felonies or violent crimes, but include every crime on the
state books.

The CA stated that "the statute itself offers no

procedural safeguards and does not set out substantive criteria, other
than the conclusory 'serious risk' test, such as prior court contacts
or lack of family supervision, to limit which accuseds juveniles may
be detained."

This is in sharp contrast to the carefully channeled

and elaborate procedural safeguards provided at disposition.

131,vr
.,,---

Juveniles detained under §7 39 (a) (ii) are entitled to a
probable cause hearing within three to six days and an expedited fact

1 section 739 (a) (i) authorizes detention at that time if,
in its view, "there is a s~bstantial probability that he will not
appear in court on the return date." Detentions authorized under
this subsection are not at issue here.
No equal protection
questions are before the Court either. Resps argued below that
equal protection was violated by using pretrial detention only
for juveniles. The DC rejected this approach and resps did not
appeal the rejection.

-- 4 -

finding hearing.
Resps filed a habeas corpus petn challenging the scheme.
The DC (SONY Carter) granted the writ, finding that §739 (a) (ii)
deprived resps of liberty without due process.
3.

DECISION BELOW:

In a<arrow opinion, the CA2 affirmed.

Judge Winter's majority opinion examined the actual operation of the

----------...----:. .- ---- - -

scheme, on the~asis of the extensive evidence presented to and factfinding made by the DC.
----------""'--

po

The evidence established that "the vast majority of
juveniles detained under 739(a) (ii) either have their petitions
dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after
adjudication ••••

The result in practice is that the vast majority of

juveniles considered sufficiently dangerous by the Family Court to
justify pre-trial incarceration under 739(a) (ii) are in fact released
••• within days or weeks."

Relying on the testimony of a Family Court

__..,,

judge called by the City, the CA attributed this to the nature of the
hearings provided and the criteria applied.

The detention hearing

under §739 (a) (ii):
"usually involves only the Family Court Judge, a prosecutor,
a Court Liaison Officer, the juvenile, his or her attorney,
and the parents or their representative. It takes place
on after the arrest •••• In the t yp ical case, the
ev i.d~ nce before the judge is limited to: (al the petition
f or eil iquency and an affidavit by a witness stating that
the petition is accurate: (b) a recommendation by the Court
Liaison Officer to detain or release the juvenile based on
inquiries and recommendations made by a probation officer
who usually is not present: (c) statements by the juvenile
or his or her attorney and by the parents or other persons
accompanying the juvenile."
The criteria utilized at the detention hearing deal solely with

<.

protecting the community.
child.

'

_______,

They do not include the interests of the

According to the testifying state judge, the preliminary

?

•

o:~~

confinement often results in

umstances harmful to the ju~

-

At the disp ositional hearing, the best interests of the child are very
important, and there is far more information about the child before
the judge -- including psychological assessments.

Two other factors

influenced the lenient disposition of adjudicated delinquents: the
time served, including the preventive detention period, is frequently
considered by the judge at the disposition to have been sufficient
punishment, and the absence of alternatives other than probation and
incarcertation usually mitigates toward the former, given the harsh
consequences of imprisonment.
The CA started with the proposition that "any exception

~
~

.,.

general rule that incarceration follow, rather than precede,

.

:P»» J:;;::b

adj ~d._,i cati:>ns_ ~f guilt can be justified, if at all, by a compellin
4<-=

4a:-7,w..z

~

governme,1tal interest."

~ ....~ . I

.,,,,,,,.

The governmental defendants argued that

prevention was such an interest, but the CA did not reach that
question
__,,.. "because 739(a) (ii) is utilized principally, not for

-

reventive purposes, but to impose punishment for unadjudicated

~

~IA,

~"41',~

?•

Over tw~thirds of 739 (a) (ii) detainees are "(1)
those against whom ' the evidence of guilt is weak or insufficient: (2)
those who are not so dangerous that they cannot be released after a
short period of detention: and (3) those who are regarded as having
served enough time in confinement."

Crime prevention is not a

rationale for detaining th~se children without usual due process
protections.

The only purpose served is punishment "since early

release -- within days or at most a few weeks -- by a Family Court
Judge contradicts any asserted need for pre-trial confinement to
protect the community."

Punishment is an unconstitutional purpose,

-

6 -

,..
given the procedures here afforded.

In In re Winship, which also

dealt with the New York juvenile justice system, this Court held that
"an adjudication of delinquency which entails the possibility of
institutional confinement must rest on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, because such confinement is constitutionally analogous to
punishment for criminal acts."
The CA, having found that the scheme has an unconstitutional
impact on most detainees, then held it unconstitutional as to all
juveniles.

Most persons detained suffer punishment without

adjudication of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and absent a
compelling governmental interest.

Individual litigation of each c ~

could never proceed to judgment given mootness considerations.

And

"the record clearly demonstrates that the unconstitutional impact of
the statute results directly from its substantively and procedurally

C-,'-" 'f
juveniles they know will be released before or at disposition." ~~

unlimited terms which cause Family Court judges to incarcerate

~

Whether the statute failed because it produces unconstitutional

results, or whether it simply fails to provide adequate guidance for

--

law enforcement personnel and courts, it violates due process: "We

hold
only
that pre-trial detention may not be imposed for anti-crime
....
r, •
....

eR z.

purposes pursuant to a substantively and procedurally unlimited

-lwlJ.

statutory authority when, in all likelihood, most detainees will

~
-1,.4,,1

either not be adjudicated guilty ot will not be sentenced to
confinement after an adjudication of guilt."
Appnts challenged the relief granted by the DC -- that the writ
be granted to all juveniles held at the time the class was certified
or who will be held before these proceedings are concluded -- as

-
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given the procedures here afforded.

In In re Winship, whi

dealt with the New York juvenile justice system, this Cour
"an adjudication of delinquency which entails the possibi J
institutional confinement must rest on proof beyond area~
doubt, because such confinement is constitutionally analogous

~u

punishment for criminal acts."
The CA, having found that the scheme has an unconstitutional
impact on most detainees, then held it unconstitutional as to all
juveniles.

Most persons detained suffer punishment without

adjudication of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and absent a
compelling governmental interest.

Individual litigation of each c ~

could never proceed to judgment given mootness considerations.

And

"the record clearly demonstrates that the unconstitutional impact of
the statute results directly from its substantively and procedurally
unlimited terms which cause Family Court judges to incarcerate
juveniles they know will be released before or at disposition."
whether the statute failed because it produces unconstitutional
results, or whether it simply fails to provide adequate guidance for
law enforcement personnel and courts, it violates due

...

hold only that pre-trial detention may not be imposed
'-'"

,.,..,

purposes pursuant to a substantively and procedurally unlimited
statutory authority when, in all likelihood, most detainees will
either not be adjudicated guilty ot will not be sentenced to
confinement after an adjudication of guilt."
APpnts challenged the relief granted by the DC -- that the writ
be granted to all juveniles held at the time the class was certified
or who will be held before these proceedings are concluded -- as

-

6 -

,.
given the procedures here afforded.

In In re Winship, which also

dealt with the New York juvenile justice system, this Court held that
"an adjudication of delinquency which entails the possit

C/1 z 's-

institutional confinement must rest on proof beyond a ri

1./Du-

doubt, because such confinement is constitutionally ana:

~-

punishment for criminal acts."

jlr., so

~

The CA, having found that the scheme has an uncons
impact on most detainees, then held it unconstitutional as to all
juveniles.

Most persons detained suffer punishment without

adjudication of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and absent a
compelling governmental interest.

Individual litigation of each c ~

could never proceed to judgment given mootness considerations.

And

"the record clearly demonstrates that the unconstitutional impact of
the statute results directly from its substantively and procedurally
unlimited terms which cause Family Court judges to incarcerate
juveniles they know will be released before or at disposition."
Whether the statute failed because it produces unconstitutional

C-,*·f
~~.4--(.

~

results, or whether it simply fails to provide adequate guidance for
law enforcement personnel and courts, it violates due
hold only that pre-trial detention may not be imposed
..,,

pc

'"•

....

purposes pursuant to a substantively and procedurally unlimited
statutory authority when, in all likelihood, most detainees will
either not be adjudicated guilty ot will not be sentenced to
confinement after an adjudication of guilt."
A~pnts challenged the relief granted by the DC -- that the writ
be granted to all juveniles held at the time the class was certified
or who will be held before these proceedings are concluded -- as

- 7 -

granting in futur~ release to those whose incarceration began atter
the DC granted the writ.

But the CA upheld the relief because class

&

actions are permissible in habeas proceedings and the writ is
available to attack future confinement.
(1968).

Peyton v. Rowe, 391

u.s~

While true that habeas is directed to the unlawful custody of ~

individuals, and while prosective relief against enforcement of

r~

affects only those detained while the action continues, and,...not those
detained after.

This focused properly on those in custody.

\I.fudge Newman concurred in the result.

He was less certain tha~

the majority that the record supports a conclusion of a significant
number of instances where detention was imposed either erroneously or
for purposes of punishment.

But, applying traditional due process

analysis he found the statute unconstitutional "because it permits
liberty to be denied, prior to adjudication of guilt, in the exercise
of unfettered discretion as to an issue of considerable uncertainty --

\\

likelihood of future criminal behavior.

Judge Newman suggested five

-

ways in which the statute fails to channel decisionmaking: 1) it d~es
not limit the crimes for which the person subject to detention has
been arested: 2) it does not require an evaluation by the
decisionmaker of the likelihood that the person committed the crime of
which he was accused -- the statute authorizes pretrial detention
without a finding of probable cause: 3) the judge is not required to
assess.the individual's background: 4) the statute places no limit on
the types of crimes the judge may determine the individual is likely
to commit: and 5) the statute does not specify any standard of proo~
by which the judge must be persuaded of a serious risk the individual

?

-

8 -

will commit crimes between the petition and disposition.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

The City appnt argues that the question

presented is substantial because it affords the Court the opportunity
to answer a question left open in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534
n. 15 (1979): namely, whether the governmental interest in protecting
the community from crime may constitutionally justify the pretrial
detention of juveniles.

The New York Ct. of Apps. has already upheld

this very scheme, People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 68~, 385
N.Y.S.2d 518, 350 N.E.2d 906 (1976), and thus this decision conflicts
with that one.

In United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C.App.

1981), cert. denied

- - U.S. - - (1982),

detention scheme for adults.

the DCCA upheld a preventive

There is no reason that a pretrial

detention scheme is necessarily unconstitutional, and it is important
that this be established.
The scheme at issue has sufficient procedural safeguards.

The

delinquency petition must be supported by an affidavit of a person
with knowledge attesting to the truth of the allegations of the petn.
The court must make a determination, and is required to state the
facts and its reasons, that there is a serious risk that the child
will commit a crime before the return date."- At the hearing, the chi"id
may have his parents present, may have an attorney, is advised of his
rights to counsel and to remain silent.

Clergymen or social workers

brought by the child or pa~ents may be questioned.

The probation

department makes a recommendation whether the juvenile should be
released or retained.

The testimony of the trial judge below revealed

that he and his colleagues, in making their decisions whether to
remand or release, consider the seriousness of the acts alleged, an

>;(':/~~

'•

;•

-
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evaluation, "if possible," of the probability that the allegations
will be sustained, the age of the victim, the time of day of the acts,
the juvenile's past record and how recent the other offenses were, any
other information developed at the hearing, and probation's
recommendation.

The decision is individualized, supported by a

judicially reviewable statement of facts and reasons.
Due process "is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."

Greenholtz v.

Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).

The procedures

outlined above are adequate to this situation.

While disputing the

CA's characterization of the results of the system, "we submit that
even assuming a majority of detainees are not placed following a
dispositional hearing, such a result does not mandate a finding of
unconstitutionality."

There is more data at the second hearing, ~nd

it should surprise no one that caution and concern for both the
juvenile and society cause judges to err on the side of remand at the
earlier hearing in the face of less data.

Further, by statute,

different considerations enter the two decisions

at the detention

hearing only society's interests are considered, because the period of
potential detention is brief.

At the second hearing, the interests of

the child are considered as well.
The fact that the statute requires a prediction of future
behavior does not make it ~nconstitutional either.
do this in the bail context, for example.

-------------issues turn on such evaluations.

(

Courts constantly

Parole and other important

The state appnt makes similar arguments, but adds that the

'----"' prospective effect of the order here was improper under habeas corpus,

- 10 -

effectively transforming the writ into an injunction enforceable
against the State and City.
Resps move to affirm.

This case does not pose the question

whether pretrial detention is ever constitutional.

The CA's decision

explicitly does not reach that question, but focuses on this statute
and even more particularly, on the results this statute produces.
This statute is patently unconstitutional, and is completely
distinguishable from the one upheld in the Edwards case.

Unlike this

statute, the one in Edwards permitted persons to be detained only if
charged with certain crimes of violence, and required a convictio~ for
a crime of violence at some point within the preceding ten year
period, or a finding that the subject crime was committed while on
bail or other release pending completion of sentence.
convincing" evidence of all elements was required.

"Clear and

The court was

required to find that no condition of release would "reasonably
assure" the safety of the community.

And the court was required to

find a "substantial probability" that the accused is guilty of the
offense.

More than half of those given pretrial detention in New York

in 1979 were charged with crimes which would preclude their
eligibility under the standard upheld in Edwards.
The narrow holding of the panel "that pre-trial detention may not
be imposed for anti-crime purposes ••• when, in all likelihood, most
detainees will either not be adjudicated guilty or will not be
sentenced to confinement after an adjudication of guilt" is correct
and should be affirmed summarily.
5.

DISCUSSION:

The CA2 certainly decided the case on narrow

,
grounds, and if its factual conclusions are correct -- that the vast

-- -...

-

11 -

majority of pretrial detentions impose
mistake or a desire to punish --

are due to

s difficult to argue that the

procedures provided are adequate

questions presented by

appellants do not squarely challenge this factual finding.

If the

Court accepted the case and decided it on these grounds, it might not
have occasion to clarify the circumstances in which pretrial detention
is constitutional, if any.

Further, there will be a temptation to

delve into the factual underpinnings of the panel's conclusions, which
could render this a very unsatisfactory vehicle to consider the large
underlying legal questions.
YJudge Newman also makes a very strong case that, whatever the
actual results under the statute, and whatever the constitutionality
of pretrial detention in the abstract, this statute is simply too
\___,

standard1ess substantively and provides insufficient procedural
safeguards to be constitutional.
any clear substantive guidelines.

Incarceration is authorized without
Were the case here on a petition

for certiorari, I would not hesitate in recommending denial.

Because

the decision below is very narrow, and appears to be correct, the
Court may wish to consider affirming.

Affirmance here would not

invalidate more careful procedures than this one.
On the other hand, the Court has not addressed the
constitutionality of pretrial detention in its prior cases.

In

considering the constitutionality of the procedures at issue, the
Court would indicate, to some degree at least, the sorts of procedures
that may or may not be acceptable constitutionally in imposing
pretrial detention.
'The CA's reading of §1254 to permit the relief granted here also

- 12 -

seems reasonable.

The order does not constitute a general injunction

against enforcing the statute, but instead orders the State to release
specified individuals.

Should the Court determine to note probable

jurisdiction on the merits, however, it should note on this remedy
question, as well.
6.

RECOMMENDATION:

I lean toward summary affirmance, but if one

appeal is to be granted, both should be granted and the two appeals
consolidated.

There is a motion to affirm.
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Abrams v. Martin

MEMO TO JOE:

This is the juvenile pre-trial de tent ion case under
the New York statute.

A class action habeas petition was

filed by three fourteen year olruveni les, each of whom
was

charged

with

violent

crimes

and

two

with

prior

criminal offenses.
Both the DC and CA2 invalidated New York procedure.
The

majority

§739(a) (ii)

opinion
of

the

process because:

of

CA2

(J.

statute,

(a)

Winter)

finding

a

invalidated

denial

of

due

.
'

in the "vast majority" of instances

where detention had been ordered "mistakes in

judgment"

had been made concerning the risk that the accused would
commit other crimes~ or (b) the detention had been imposed

..P

~·.J .

"solely as punishment for unadjudicated crimes".
AN

~~ ~~
I

&

basis,

the

C/I '2~
.gf and.I\ majority concluded that the statute

~~
granted "li'2:!-tless -*cretiqn
~ / - ~ v t - -;esulting in numerous mistaken

f

~

.,

On this

to family court

judges"

-

.-

decisions.

Judge Newman stated that he was "less certain than
the

majority

that

the

record

supports

a

con,ifusion of

~ ~ a-./.-&...h.t..k I-,, ~ -11~.f~

~~,(~!-Jut)

,

2.

significant

number

of

instances

where

detention

imposed even mistakenly or for purposes of punishment.
24a."

was
A.

Nevertheless, applying my three-step analysis in

Matthew,

found

Newman

the

statute

authorized

an

impermissible denial of liberty "prior to adjudication of

- ---------------

guilt.

the

in the unfetter discretion as to

likelihood of criminal behavior." A. 24a.
The New York Procedure
The long descriptions of

the New York procedure in

the briefs are not easy to follow.
from

you,

Joe,

procedure

to

is accurate:

.,juveniles..-"\ (as
without

as

a

I

whether

understanding

of

the

Police have authority to arrest

understand

warrant).

my

I will need guidance

A

it,

on

juvenile

probable

cause

proceeding

then

but
is

commenced by a petition of delinquency filed by the New
The petition

York City Department of Juvenile Justice.
identifies

the crime

that,

by statute,

is any crime -

misdemeanor or felony - that would constitute a crime if
committed by an adult.
juvenile
subsequent

requires

The petition must allege that the

treatment

or

elaborate procedural

Prior

confinement.
safeguards,

the

to

statute

authorizes the Family Court Judge to order detention of
the

juvenile

if

the

judge

finds

and

sets

for th

his

i'

3.

~

~

<.ffet ~. 1;;-~~

,p
~jpt/(~,~~-

?

indings and reasons - that "there is a serious risk that

the juvenile

(prior to the return date of the petition)

,,

will commit an act that would constitute a crime by an

,,

LIE.JICA~dlfc..u?fa~1·~ ~

adult.

understanding is that the statute then requires a

My

-

probable cause hearing within six days, and thereafter an
,-,

.....

expedited

fact

finding

hearing.

It

that

fact

finding

hearing

before

the

is not clear to me
the

Judge must be held within these six-days.
an important point.

Family Court
This is rather

In any event, at such a hearing the

juvenile will be found a deliquent or the petition will be
dismissed.

If held to be a delinquent, further procedural

safeguards

are

provided

before final disposition.

including

a

probation

report

In making such disposition, the

judge has a number of alternatives including return to the
juvenile's home, probation, treatment, or incarceration.
GENERAL COMMENTS

I

voted

to

dismiss,

rather

than

note

probable

jurisdiction, because I was then under the impression that
both the DC and the CA2 had made the findings of fact I
mentioned above.

I must say, however, that the facts as

stated in the briefs of Fred Schwartz (formerly a Cravath
partner, as I recall),

Corporation Counsel of the City of

r

I

4.

New York, and the New York Attorney General put this case
in an entirely different light.
however,

to

review

the

It is not our function,

factual

record

if

indeed

both

courts below specificallly found these facts.
Even on the basis of these findings, my decision in

~ Gerstein

v. Pugh provides a good deal of support for the

view that the New York statute is not nearly so outrageous
as the courts below and the ACLU brief assert.

The only

significant difference between this case and Gerstein, as
__.-,

I understand

1lv-:J
~~ require
tt,vf";s'"

---

it,

is that the New York statute does not

finding

a

probable

of

contemporaneously with

cause

to

be

made

the pre-trial detention decision.

But if a hearing on that issue must be held within six
days, I am not sure that due process has been denied.
Two compelling interests are involved in this case:
The

liberty

protected

interest

and

from er ime,

the

public

particularly

interest
the

in

type of

being
street

crimes that juvenile now commit with shocking frequency.
See,

e.g.,

the

record of

the

three-named plaintiffs

in

this case (pp. 16, 18 and 19 of the State's brief).
In sum, Joe, I am not rest in this case and will be
intersted in your views.
LFP, JR.

•

~ --~
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(

7
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Joseph Neuhaus

Question Presented
whether New York's scheme of pre-trial detention of juveniles
in cases in which there is Ila serious risk" that the juvenile
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may commit a crime prior to trial,

page 2.

is a violation of the Due

Process Clause.
Statutory Scheme
My understanding

of

New York's

with yours as set forth in your memo of
nience,

For conve-

I(Q'll summarize

petition of delinquency..., must be filed within four 1.4 t

I

arrested,

After a juvenile is

'l

-------------

days.

(The pre-petition period of

here.)

The petition must on its face provide "reasonable cause"

detention

is not at
'

-

issue

(

\l

to believe the juvenile did an act which, if done by an adult,
would constitute a er ime
er ime") .

If

the

(herein referred to as "committed a

juvenile

is

in

detention--alternatively,

he

might have been arrested and released--the juvenile has his "initial appearance" or "detention hearing" on the first day that the
court sits after the petition is filed.

At this informal hear-

ing, the judge decides whether the juvenile should be released or
detained

pending

further

proceedings.

He

-

is detained

if

the

judge finds, inter alia, "a serious risk that [the juvenile] may
before the return date" commit a er ime.

&

maximum

of

charges,

and a maximum o: 0ays for

days

for

misdemeanor

The detention lasts a

and

less

good cause shown.)

felony

serious felony charges.

(The statutory periods are 3 and 14 days, with a ~
sion for

serious

Within that time ~

t -day extenact-finding

hearing (i.e., a trial) must be held in which delinquency is adjudicated.

It is this pre-trial detention that is at issue here.
_.

uz:$

Within 6 days

I

.......

µ

> ,,,,...___ 11

%~ ys

;we

¢

fZC4

with an extension of 3 days)

initial appearance,l Uobable cause hearing must be held.

of the
This

.&h :

-e
~~

.
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is a formal hear ing--i. e. , with cross-examination and applying
the hearsay rules--to determine if there was probable cause to
ti

effect the arrest and detain the juvenile.

,,

The _probable cause

-

hearing and the fact-finding hearing may coincide.

For misde-

meanor and less serious felony charges, the maximum time periods
prior to each hearing are the same.

For serious felony charges,

the time period for a probable cause hearing is shorter than for
the fact-finding hearing.

If the juvenile was not detained at

the initial appearance, it appears that no probable cause hearing
is held, and the fact-finding hearing must be held within 60 to
120 days.

For

detained

juveniles

dispositional hearing

who

(i.e.,

are

adjudicated

sentencing)

is

held

delinquent,

a

within 10-20

days of the fact-finding hearing.

Discussion

@There

are two aspects to the problem presented ~

_...

~

his case:

the Fourth Amendment probable cause question, and the due process
arbitrariness question.

asks whether the detention
v
here satisfies the standards of your opinion in Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S.

103

(1975).

The

first

The second asks whether in any case the

detention imposed by New York is essentially arbitrary, generally
.,...
under the standards of your opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976).

The plaintiffs' challenge in this case is based

entirely on the Due Process Clause, and thus the Gerstein ques-

r----

tion has not been separately addressed here or in the opinions
below.

It appears in this case primarily because of the argument

Nos. 82-1248, 82-12 '

that

requiring a

Schall v. Martin

page 4.

finding of probable cause would decrease the

arbitrariness of the de tent ion.

See J. A. 121 (concurring opin-

ion): see also J.A. 69, 86-88 (District Court opinion: detention
without

probable

cause

is

per

se

violation of

due

process) .

Therefore, I am not entirely certain to what extent the separate
Fourth Amendment question should be reached in this case.

I ad-

dress it only briefly.
1.
v.

Probable cause.

Pugh held

that

Your opinion for the Court in Gerstein

the Fourth Amendment

requires

the State to

"provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a
condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and
this determination must b-e- made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest."

420 U.S., at 125.

The determi-

nation might be entirely informal, that is, nonadversar ial and
based on hearsay and written testimony.

Id., at 120.

There are

two potential hearings in this case that may satisfy these standards.

First,

there

initial appearance.

is the very informal detention hearing or
Second, there is the more formal "probable

cause hearing" three to six days later.

Each is problematic.

At

the first, there is no requirement of a judicial finding of probable cause.

The only way it can be construed a probable cause

•

hearing at all is that the petition is required to give "reasonable cause" to believe the juvenile committed a crime, and the
juvenile's lawyer apparently may challenge the sufficiency of the
,

petition at that initial appearance, see J.A. 255: N.Y. Br. at 5.
is completely adequate procedurally, but
--------~
-- -rather late, only after three to six days of detention.
-- \~

The second hearing

.......___

comes

::::;-,

it

;

Nos. 82-1248, 82-12 ·
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1~~~
~~

My inclination is to say that these procedures would satisfy
the requirement of a probable cause hearing.

Gerstein explicitly

recognized "the desirability of flexibility and experimentation
by the States" in designing their procedures.
suspect neither of
alone.

Id., at 123.

the hearings would satisfy the

Gerstein itself

I

requirement

invalidated a procedure like the first

hearing here under which there was an appearance before a judicial officer that lacked one "crucial" requirement:
trate

does

not make

U.S., at 109.

"the magis-

a determination of probable cause."

420

As for the second hearing, Gerstein does not quan-

tify its test of

"significant pretrial restraint of liberty"--

elsewhere it uses the term "extended restraint of liberty following arrest," id., at 114--but six days seems like a fairly long
time to be in jail without this important procedural safeguard.
Nevertheless,

in

combination

the

two hearings may be enough.

Presumably, the ability to challenge the petition--which New York
represents is permissible--will enable truly egregious cases to
be

caught.

The

formal

probable-cause

determination

shortly

thereafter will ensure that all arrests are subject to some fairly swift review.

A contrary answer presumably would require New

York to forgo formality

in favor of swiftness, which would be

somewhat contrary to Gerstein's encouragement of experimentation.
(Of course

the Court simply could

require New York to have a

swift and informal probable cause determination in all cases: if
the s'tate desired a later, more formal determination, it could
add it as a matter of state law.)

__________________

Moreover, the_ N_e_w
_ Y
_o_ rk sch~ e

appears to be very close
to the .........,_....
procedure followed in the federal
....,
...,_

~

7'-tJ

1e4_

12 ~~,r.l!liJ.,,.Q.,
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See Fed.
P. 5,
___R.
,,___.,.."'Crim.
41,.,_•. .,. ,_,...,_,...
.., ,._ 5.1 ( nitial appearance immedi-

ately, at which facial validity of co plaint may be challenged;
'' probable caus ~ hearing within 10 days

f in custody, 20 days if

~

not).
Due process.

2.

inquiry.

Compliance with Gerstein does not end the

'
Th e II~ue process argument\.\.. 1n
t h'1s case--w h'1c h is the

only argument fully presented in the briefs--is essentially that
New York's procedj!!eS leaQ to arbitrary
results.
...
.
~

That is, that

the decision of which juveniles are detained and which are released is arbitrary and capricious.

Put in terms of Mathews v.

Eldridge, the argument is that the risk of an "erroneous" deprivation of the juvenile's admittedly important liberty interest is
too high--it outweighs the government's also important interest
in proceeding as it does.

"Erroneous" in this context presumably

means that juveniles are detained who in fact do not present a
serious risk of criminal behavior in the relevant time period.
I

am persuaded by the factual evidence presented that the

sy~em here operates in a plainly irrational fashion.

Its stated

'--"

goal is to prevent the juvenile from committing crime during the
period between arrest and trial.

But under the system as it op-

erates, it appears that at least i!_ majority, and perhaps a vast
majority, of juveniles who are detained ultimately are not adjudicated delinquent or are placed in some manner or other back on
the street.

This can make no sense: if the goal is to restrain

the j'uvenile from committing crime,

it is irrational to detain

him for at most two weeks, and then release him thereafter.

The

same is true of the alternative purpose of helping the child by

l

Nos. 82-1248, 82-17
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keeping him out of trouble.

It is true that the figures are not

as reliable as they might be.

But I agree with you that it is

not the function of this Court to review the facts specifically
found by both courts below.

In any case, the journal article and

nationwide study cited by the plaintiffs on pp.
brief confirm the findings below.
of

juveniles

is

about

79-80 of their

Nationwide, pretrial detention

seven or

eight

times more frequent

than

post-adjudication commitment to secure facilities.
These facts are not simply or solely a matter of judges misapplying

the statute.

court

the

at

By its

terms,

the statute

instructs the

initial appearance to consider almost exclusively

the need to prevent crime, while at the time of disposition the
court is instructed to consider in addition the best interests of
the child, see J.A. 100.
statute,

This in fact is how judges apply the

emphasizing principally

the

needs of

the community at

the initial appearance and the interests of the child at the disposition stage.

J.A. 105-106.

This trivial-seeming distinction

appears more than anything else to account for the disparity that
plaintiffs have shown.
In

addition,

the

District Court

noted

that

juveniles

fre-

quently are detained after having been released upon arrest several days or
that

this

statute.

is

weeks

earlier.

J.A.

83-86.

I

"the most patently arbitrary"

the DC

application of

the

J.A. 83.

There are two possible justifications for
fairs.

agree with

this state of af-

One is that New York is, as it claims, seeking to further

the purely administrative

(as opposed to "penal") purpose of en-

Wtn-tr.1 .:
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suring that juveniles do not commit further crimes while awaiting
trial, but that it is enormously unsuccessful in doing so.

Once

more information is obtained, detention is seen as unwarranted.
This rationale is undercut to some extent by the fact that the
statute in fact mandates different standards at the detention and
dispositional hearings.

Nevertheless it is the defense of the

statute offered by the New York Court of Appeals when it upheld
the law against a constitutional challenge using similar statistics.

That court emphasized that the State's leeway with juve-

niles properly is far greater than with adults:
"It should surprise no one that caution and concern for
both the juvenile and society may indicate the more
conservative decision to detain at the very outset,
whereas the later development of very much more relevant information may prove that while a finding of delinquency was warranted, placement would not be indicated." People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y. 2d
682, 690 (1976).
The second possible defense of the statute is that merely
preventing the juvenile from committing er ime during the weeks
before trial is not the sole aim.

Rather, detention is imposed

as a swift and general punishment or rehabilitation for the most
serious juvenile offenders.

The theory presumably would be that

a brief stay in detention takes the child out of his gang and
does long-term good.

This rationale was hinted at in the New

York Court of Appeals' opinion.

See id., at 689.

Both defenses share an emphasis on the fact that it is juveniles'who are involved here, and in my view this is the soundest

tion statute that had a penal or rehabilitative purpose, or had

..
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Schall v. Martin

--·

page 9.

the kind of error rate that this statute has could survive a consti tutional challenge if the accused were adults.

Either more

procedural safeguards would be required to minimize error, or, if
that were not possible, pretrial detention on the basis of a pre-tl"),1.,-0diction

of

future

dangerousness

would

be

(Basing

post-trial

sentencing on

future

dangerousness

different,

barred

because the accused has been convicted.

altogether.
is very

This means

that the constraints on the State's treatment are broader, and
there is a surer basis for inferring future dangerousness.

Also,

basing pretrial detention on factors such as the risk of flight
is different, because the prediction is more specific and therefore more certain.)

---

The question then is whether

-

( 1)

an error rate as high as

..........

this one in an administrative detention system, or (2) a pretrial
detention system based on a rehabilitative or penal purpose, is
acceptable when dealing with juveniles.
is not.

It

My conclusion is that it

\, \.

The error rate was what was considered at length below.

It is here that the Mathews analysis

is most relevant.

Since

both the juvenile's and the government's interest are reasonably
\ ; arge in this case,

the primary question is whether there are

ocedur~s that could be i ~
Ju~:_ Ne! m.!_.n ' s

concurrence

would reduce the risk.
suggested

five

~ v ~ought would reduce the risk of error.

)v,Jf"'

v_iew,

fit

procedures
J .A.

121-122.

that

he

In my

would= ~ First and second,

there is no reliable evidence that predictability of future criminal behavior is improved either by limiting the pool to those
juveniles who are accused of committing an especially serious

Nos. 82-1248, 82-1 '
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crime, nor by limiting the crimes sought to be prevented.

As to

the first, it might be expected that the joy-rider or turnstilehopper would be more likely to do it again than the murderer or
rapist.

As to the second, there is evidence in the record that

it is generally less accurate to try to select those who will
commit violent crimes than those who will commit crimes generally.

Third, it does not seem to me likely that adding an explicit

direction that judges consider juveniles' backgrounds would make
much difference--the "serious risk" criterion suggests that inquiry, and it seems likely that all judges in fact do consider
such evidence to the extent it is available.

The requirement

that they state facts and reasons further ensures that they do.
Fourth, the lack of a standard of proof seems to me minor, especially since the "serious risk" standard serves the same function: it determines the degree of certainty that the juvenile in
fact will commit a crime.

Fifth, an explicit probable cause _de-

____

-----~

termination
probably would not make much difference since peti....__
......,

---

tions unsupported by probable cause already can be dismissed on
motion.
In my view, the one significant change in the statute that

would make a difference, and that would answer to the concerns
~

raised in this case, would be to require judg~
those

they ' t easonably

dispositional hearing.

expected

would

be

1J

to detain O12)-y

incarcerated

\'

at

he

This is a substantive change in the stat-

ute, and may involve a prediction that is difficult to make with
any great precision.

But it would reduce in a relevant way the

number of incarcerated juveniles and would not "cost" the govern-

Nos. 82-1248, 82-1
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ment very much in terms of its stated goal of restraining crime
behavior.

Therefore,

under Mathews

the New York procedure

is

lacking in due process.
Even if no other procedures are available to accomplish what
the State seeks to do here, it seems to me that the error rate
simply

is

too

high.

The government's

interest

in

preventing

crime by the truly dangerous during the fairl L b~ ief Eeriod__! that
are involved here simply is not great enough to justify detaining

-------------------------------------------------

massive numbers of apparently nondangerous others.
It may be argued

that

the government

interest

is

in fact

~

greater, because the incarceration at issue here has a lasting ~
effect.

This is essentially a rehabilitative rationale.

are several problems with it.
York's

legislature has made

There ~ ~

First, it is not clear that
the necessary findings.

In

N~~

fact,

there is evidence of "profound legislative concern that detention
is bad for children, not good for them."
(Fuchsberg, J., concurring in result).
tation
sense.

is normally considered

Schupf, supra, at 692

More important, rehabili-

"punishment"

in

the due process

Generally, the imposition of "punishment" must be accom-

panied by a trial to determine past wrong.
ferent simply because juveniles are involved.

The rule is no difSee In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

These cases

held that the normal elements of due process apply in a proceeding at which incarceration of a juvenile is sought, even he is to
,
be sent to a state "school." The only major differences between
this case and those are the length of the stay contemplated, and
the fact that it is not accompanied by a stigmatizing label of

Nos. 82-1248, 82-17
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These differences are not unimportant, but it seems

to me that the basic fact is that this is imprisonment that can
have a profound effect on children.
ulation,

it

Given the nature of the pop-

is not an ef feet that is necessarily a good one.

Moreover, it is not clear to me that there is no stigma if the

1«,";r juvenile

does not show up in school or at work for this reason.

~

These effects should not be

~

blance of

~ lacking
~~

~-~

a

with

adequate preparation time.

That was

here.
difJUl~5

To summarize, it seems to me that your initial vote to~~ffirm
correct.

~

trial,

imposed without at least the sem-

The plaintiffs have shown that New York's pretrial

ention system results in an unacceptably hi 9,.h nu,mbe.{_~f erroneous or irrational detentions if the statute is justified on a

...

theory of crime prevention.
the

statute,

by

the

This result appears to be built into

way

the

standards

dispositional hearings are set up.

at

the

detention

and

If the detention is justified

on a broader rehabilitative rationale, the State still must follow normal adjudicative procedures before imposing this treatment.
RECOMMENDATION:

P.S.

Affirm.

If you find this case as difficult as I have, you may

find the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals in the Schupf
case to be helpful.

They are brief and written from a broader,

sociat policy perspective than was taken in the courts below.

As

will be obvious, I find the concurrence's argument more persuasive than the majority's.

I have attached a copy.
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/J 4- ~ JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

..I)/

~ A.Ah.A'~ection 320.5(3)(b) of the New York Family Court Act
__ ~ /J.. J /)-. I
1
• ~ ..

..-...-- --(FCA)

authorizes pretrial detention of an accused juvenile
delinquent based on a finding that there is a "serious risk"
that the child "may before the return date commit an act
which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime." 1
1

Section 320.5 of the Family Court Act provides, in relevant part:

"l. At the initial appearance, the court in its discretion may release the

respondent or direct his detention.
3. The court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts
and reasons for so finding that unless the respondent is detained;
(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on
the return date; or
(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date commit an
act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime."
Appellees have only challenged pretrial detention under § 320.5(3)(b).
Thus, the propriety of detention to ensure that a juvenile appears in court
on the return date, pursuant to § 320.5(3)(a), is not before the Court.
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Appellees brought suit on behalf of a class of all juveniles detained pursuant to that provision. 2 The district court struck
down § 320.5(3)(b) as permitting detention without due process of law and ordered the immediate release of all class
members. 513 F. Supp. 691 (1981). The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding the provision "unconstitutional as to all juveniles" because the statute was administered in such a way that "the detention period serves as
punishment imposed without proof of guilt established according to the requisite constitutional standard." 689 F. 2d
365, 373-374 (1982). We noted probable jurisdiction, - U. S. - - (1983), 3 and now reverse. Section 320.5(3)(b) is
2
The original challenge was to § 739(a)(ii) of the New York Family Court
Act, which, at the time of the commencement of this suit, governed pretrial
release or detention of both alleged juvenile delinquents and persons in
need of supervision. Effective July 1, 1983, a new Article 3 to the Act
governs, inter alia, "all juvenile delinquency actions and proceedings commenced upon or after the effective date thereof and all appeals and other
post-judgment proceedings relating or attaching thereto."
FCA
§ 301.3(1). Article 7 now applies only to proceedings concerning persons
in need of supervision.
Obviously, this Court must "review the judgment below in light of the
... statute as it now stands, not as it once did." Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S.
45, 48 (1969). But since new Article 3 contains a preventive detention section identical to former § 739(a)(ii), see FCA § 320.5(3), the appeal is not
moot. Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41, 43 (1969).
3
Although the pretrial detention of the class representatives has long
since ended, see pp. 3-7, infra, this case is not moot for the same reason
that the class action in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110 n. 11 (1975),
was not mooted by the termination of the claims of the named plaintiffs.
"Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any
given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The individual could nonetheless
suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly
situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures.
The claim, in short, is one that is distinctly 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"
See also People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 519-520
(1976).
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not invalid "on its face," and its application to the three
named plaintiffs in this case did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
I
Appellee Gregory Martin was arrested on December 13,
1977, and charged with first-degree robbery, second-degree
assault, and criminal possession of a weapon based on an incident in which he, with two others, allegedly hit a youth on
the head with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and sneakers.
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Martin had possession of the gun
when he was arrested. He was 14 years old at the time and,
therefore, came within the jurisdiction of New York's Family
Court. 4 The incident occurred at 11:30 at night, and Martin
lied to the police about where and with whom he lived. He
was consequently detained overnight. 5
' In New York, a child over the age of seven but less than sixteen is not
considered criminally responsible for his conduct. FCA § 301.2(1). If he
commits an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, he
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court. Id., at
§ 302.1(1). That court is charged not with finding guilt and affixing punishment, In re Bogart, 259 N. Y. S. 2d 351 (1963), but rather with determining and pursuing the needs and best interests of the child insofar as
those are consistent with the need for the protection of the community.
FCA §301.1. See In re Craig S ., 394 N. Y. S. 2d 200 (1977). Juvenile
proceedings are, thus, civil rather than criminal, although because of the
restrictions that may be placed on a juvenile adjudged delinquent, some of
the same protections afforded accused adult criminals are also applicable in
this context. Cf. FCA § 303.1.
5
When a juvenile is arrested, the arresting officer must immediately
notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the child's care.
FCA § 305.2(3). Ordinarily, the child will be released into the custody of
his parent or guardian after being issued an "appearance ticket" requiring
him to meet with the probation service on a specified day. Id., at
§ 307.1(1). See n. 9, supra. If, however, he is charged with a serious
crime, one of several designated felonies, see id., at § 301.2(8), or if his parent or guardian cannot be reached, the juvenile may be taken directly before the Family Court. Id., at § 305.2. The Family Court judge will
make a preliminary determination as to the jurisdiction of the court, ap-
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A petition of delinquency was filed, 6 and Martin made his
"initial appearance" in Family Court on December 14th, accompanied by his grandmother. 7 The Family Court judge,
citing the possession of the loaded weapon, the false address
given to the police, and the lateness of the hour, as evidencing a lack of supervision, ordered Martin detained under
§ 320.5(3)(b) (at that time § 739(a)(ii); see n. 2, supra). A
probable cause hearing was held five days later, on December 19th, and probable cause was found to exist for all the
crimes charged. At the fact-finding hearing held December
27-29, Martin was found guilty on the robbery and criminal
possession charges. He was adjudicated a delinquent and
point a law guardian for the child, and advise the child of his or her rights,
including the right to counsel and the right to remain silent.
Only if, as in Martin's case, the Family Court is not in session and special
circumstances exist, such as an inability to notify the parents, will the child
be taken directly by the arresting officer to a juvenile detention facility.
Id., at § 305.2(4)(c). If the juvenile is so detained, he must be brought before the Family Court within 72 hours or the next day the court is in session, whichever is sooner. Id., at 307.3(4). The propriety of such detention, prior to a juvenile's initial appearance in Family Court, is not at issue
in this case. Appellees challenged only judicially ordered detention pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b).
6
A delinquency petition, prepared by the "presentment agency," originates delinquency proceedings. FCA § 310.1. The petition must contain,
inter alia, a precise statement of each crime charged and factual allegations which "clearly apprise" the juvenile of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation. Id., at § 311.1. A petition is not deemed sufficient
unless the allegations of the factual part of the petition, together with those
of any supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide reasonable
cause to believe that the juvenile committed the crime or crimes charged.
Id., at § 311.2(2). Also, nonhearsay allegations in the petition and supporting deposition must establish, if true, every element of each crime
charged and the juvenile's commission thereof. Id. , at §311.2(3). The
sufficiency of a petition may be tested by filing a motion to dismiss under
§ 315.1.
7
The first proceeding in Family Court following the filing of the petition
is known as the initial appearance even if the juvenile has already been
brought before the court immediately following his arrest. FCA § 320.2.
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placed on two years' probation. 8 He had been detained pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b), between the initial appearance and the
completion of the fact-finding hearing, for a total of fifteen
days.
Appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan, both age 14,
were also ordered detained pending their fact-finding hearings. Rosario was charged with attempted first-degree robbery and second-degree assault for an incident in which he,
with four others, allegedly tried to rob two men, putting a
gun to the head of one of them and beating both about the
head with sticks. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. At the time of
his initial appearance, on March 15, 1979, Rosario had another delinquency petition pending for knifing a student, and
The "fact finding" is the juvenile's analogue of a trial. As in the earlier
proceedings, the juvenile has a right to counsel at this hearing. Id. , at
§ 341.2. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). Evidence may be suppressed on the same grounds as in criminal cases, FCA § 330.2, and proof
of guilt, based on the record evidence, must be beyond a reasonable doubt,
id., at§ 342.2. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). If guilt is established, the court enters an appropriate order and schedules a dispositional
hearing. Id., at§ 345.1.
The dispositional hearing is the final and most important proceeding in
the Family Court. If the juvenile has committed a designated felony, the
court must order a probation investigation and a diagnostic assessment.
Id., at § 351.1. Any other material and relevant evidence may be offered
by the probation agency or the juvenile. Both sides may call and crossexamine witnesses and recommend specific dispositional alternatives.
Id., at § 350.4. The court must find, based on a preponderance of the evidence, id. , at§ 350.3(2), that the juvenile is delinquent and requires supervision, treatment or confinement. Id., at § 352.1. Otherwise, the petition is dismissed. Ibid.
If the juvenile is found to be delinquent, then the court enters an order of
disposition. Possible alternatives include a conditional discharge; probation for up to two years; nonsecure placement with, perhaps, a relative or
the division for youth; transfer to the commissioner of mental health; or
secure placement. Id., at§ 353.1-§ 353.5. Unless the juvenile committed
one of the designated felonies, the court must order the least restrictive
available alternative consistent with the needs and best interests of the juvenile and the need for protection of the community. Id., at§ 352.2(2).
8
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two prior petitions had been adjusted. 9 Probable cause was
found on March 21. On April 11, Rosario was released to his
father, and the case was terminated without adjustment on
September 25, 1979.
Kenneth Morgan was charged with attempted robbery and
attempted grand larceny for an incident in which he and another boy allegedly tried to steal money from a 14-year-old
girl and her brother by threatening to blow theirs heads off
and grabbing them to search their pockets. See Plaintiff's
Exhibit 3. Morgan, like Rosario, was on release status on
another petition (for robbery and criminal possession of
stolen property) at the time of his initial appearance on
March 27, 1978. He had been arrested four previous times,
and his mother refused to come to court because he had been
in trouble so of ten she did not want him home. A probable
cause hearing was set for March 30, but was continued until
April 4, when it was combined with a fact-finding hearing.
Morgan was found guilty of harassment and petit larceny and
was ordered placed with the Department of Social Services
9
Every accused juvenile is interviewed by a member of the staff of the
probation department. This process is known as "probation intake." See
Testimony of Mr. Benjamin (Supervisor, New York Dept. of Probation),
J. A., at 142. In the course of the interview, which lasts an average of 45
minutes, the probation officer will gather what information he can about
the nature of the case, the attitudes of the parties involved, and the child's
past history and current family circumstances. Id., at 144, 153. His
sources of information are the child, his parent or guardian, the arresting
officer and any records of past contacts between the child and the Family
Court. On the basis of this interview, the probation officer may attempt
to "adjust," or informally resolve, the case. FCA § 308.1(2). Adjustment
is a purely voluntary process in which the complaining witness agrees not
to press the case further, while the juvenile is given a warning or agrees to
counseling sessions or, perhaps, referral to a community agency. Id., at
§ 308.1 (Practice Commentary). In cases involving designated felonies or
other serious crimes, adjustment is not permitted without written approval
of the Family Court. Id., at §308.1(4). If a case is not informally adjusted, it is referred to the "presentment agency." Seen. 6, infra.
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for 18 months. He was detained a total of eight days between his initial appearance and the fact-finding hearing.
On December 21, 1977, w}lile still in £I'eventive detention
pending his fact-finding hearing, GregoryMartin instituted a
ha ~ corpus class action on behalf of "those persons who
are, or uring the p ndency of this action, will be preventively detained pursuant to" § 320.5(3)(b) of the Family Court
Act. Rosario and Morgan were subsequently added as additional n a ~ These three class representatives
sought a declaratory judgment that § 320.5(3)(b) violates the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In an unpublished opinion, the district court certified the
class. ~ The court also held that appellees
~ not required to exhaust their state remedies before resorting tofeaeral habeas because the highest state court had
already rejected an identicalchallenge to the juvenile preventive detention statute. See People ex rel. Wayburn v.
Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (1976). Exhaustion of state
remedies, therefore, would be "an exercise in futility."
J. A., at 26.
At trial, appellees offered in evidence the case histories of
thirty-four members of the class, including the three named
petitioners. Both parties presented some general statistics
on the relation between pretrial detention and ultimate disposition. In addition, there was testimony concerning juvenile
proceedings from a number of witnesses, including a legal aid
attorney specializing in juvenile cases, a probation supervisor, a child psychologist, and a Family Court judge. On the
basis of this evidence, the district court rejected the equal
10
We have never decided whether Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 23, providing for
class actions, is applicable to petitions for habeas corpus relief. See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 527 n. 6 (1979); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25,
30 (1976). Although appellants contested the class certification in the district court, they did not raise the issue on appeal; nor do they urge it here.
Again , therefore, we have no occasion to reach the question.
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protection challenge as "insubstantial," 11 but agreed with appellees that pretrial detention under the Family Court Act
violates due process. 12 The court ordered that ']!!__ class
members in custody pursuant to Family Court Act Section
[320.5(3)(b) sha be re se orthwith." J. A., at 93.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. After reviewing the trial
record, the court opined that "the vast majority of juveniles
detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] either have their petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released
after adjudication." 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court concluded
from that fact that§ 320.5(3)(b) "is utilized principally, not for
preventive purposes, but to impose punishment for
unadjudicated criminal acts." Id., at 372. The early release
of so many of those detained contradicts any asserted need
for pretrial confinement to protect the community. The
court went on to conclude that since § 320.5(3)(b) has an un11
The equal protection claim, which was neither raised on appeal nor decided by the Second Circuit, is not before us.
12
The district court gave three reasons for this conclusion. First, under
the Family Court Act, a juvenile may be held in pretrial detention for up to
five days without any judicial determination of probable cause. Relying
on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975), the district court concluded
that pretrial detention without a prior adjudication of probable cause is,
itself, a per se violation of due process. 513 F. Supp., at 717.
Second, after a review of the pertinent scholarly literature, the court
noted that "no diagnostic tools have as yet been devised which enable even
the most highly trained criminologists to predict reliably which juveniles
will engage in violent crime." 513 F. Supp., at 708. Afortiori, the court
concluded, a Family Court judge cannot make a reliable prediction based
on the limited information available to him at the initial appearance. Id.,
at 712. Moreover, the court felt that the trial record was "replete" with
examples of arbitrary and capricious detentions. Id., at 713.
Finally, the court concluded that preventive detention is merely a euphemism for punishment imposed without an adjudication of guilt. The alleged purpose of the detention-to protect society from the juvenile's criminal conduct-is indistinguishable from the purpose of post-trial detention.
And given "the inability of trial judges to predict which juveniles will commit crimes," there is no rational connection between the decision to detain
and the alleged purpose, even if that purpose were legitimate. Id., at 716.
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constitutional impact on the vast majority of juveniles detained under it, it must be declared unconstitutional as to all
juveniles. Individual litigation would be a practical impossibility because the periods of detention are so short that the
litigation is mooted before the merits are determined. 13

II
There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable
in juvenile proceedings. "The problem," we have stressed,
"is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings." In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1,
13-14 (1967). We have held that certain basic constitutional
protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to
juveniles. See In re Gault, supra, at 31-57 (notice of
charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination,
right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship,
397 U. S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed
v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy). But the
Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences
in the treatment of juveniles. See, e.g., McKeiverv. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial). The
State has "a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child," Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U. S. 745, 766 (1982), which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial. We have
tried, therefore, to strike a balance-to respect the "informality" and "flexibility" that characterize juvenile proceedings, In re Winship, supra, at 366, and yet to ensure that
such proceedings comport with the "fundamental fairness"
demanded by the Due Process Clause. Breed v. Jones,
supra, at 531; McKeiver, supra, at 543 (plurality opinion).
3
' Judge Newman concurred separately.
He was not convinced that the
record supported the majority's statistical conclusions. But he thought
that the statute was procedurally infirm because it granted unbridled discretion to Family Court judges to make an inherently uncertain prediction
of future criminal behavior. 689 F. 2d, at 377.

'.
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The statutory provision at issue in this case, § 320.5(3)(b),
permits a brief pretrial detention based on a finding of a "serious risk" that an a ~ e n i l e may commit a crime before his return date. The question before the Court is
whether preventive detention of juveniles pursuant to
§ 320.5(3)(b) is compatible with the "fundamental fairness"
required by due process. In contrast to the Court of Appeals, we feel constrained to address this question with reference to the pretrial detention of the three named plaintiffs to
this action.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the underlying purpose of the statute is punitive, not preventive. It drew that
conclusion based on its own perception that too many juveniles had been wrongly detained under § 320.5(3)(b). No
specific juveniles were mentioned, however. None of the
three name~ntiffs was found to h~ve been wrongly detained. The Court of Appeals, in fact, never so much as
mentioned the names of the class representatives, much less
the specific circumstances of their detention. The court instead relied heavily on "case histories" of class members
other than the named parties and statistics drawn from earlier experience with pretrial detention in the New York juvenile system. But while such statistics and case histories may
illuminate the application of a statute to the named parties,
they cannot afford a basis for class-wide relief if the particular circumstances of the named parties themselves do not afford it.
The constitutionality of the statute can only be ·udged by
reference to t e named plaintiffs since the very foundation of
the power o e era courts lies in the authority and duty of
those courts to decide cases and controversies properly before them. A federal court "has no jurisdiction to pronounce
any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void,
because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is
called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual
controversies." Steamship Co. v. Emigration Commission-
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ers, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885). A direct corollary of this principle is "the rule that one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional." United States v. Raines, 362
u. s. 17, 21 (1960).
Thus, outside of the area where First Amendment considerations permit challenges to the facial validity of a statute
based on overbreadth, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747
(1982), a criminal statute may be attacked only in its application to particular individuals. If the New York statutory
provision in question is constitutionally infirm as to one or
more of the three named parties to this action, other members of the class who share constitutionally similar characteristics may benefit from the adjudication of unconstitutionality; but if§ 320.5(3)(b) is valid as applied to each of the
three named parties, the fact that it might in some circumstances be applied in an unconstitutional manner to unnamed
members of the class or to other persons who were once or
could hypothetically be detained affords no ground for relief
in this case. Just as "a class representative must be part of
the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer from the
same injury' as the class members," East Texas Motor
Freight v. Rodrigitez, 431 U. S. 395, 403 (1977) (quoting
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418
U. S. 208, 216), so, too, the characteristics of the unnamed
members of a class which are not shared by the named members of the class cannot enlarge the legal issues presented to
the court by the named parties. General Telephone Co. of
Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147, 156-157 (1982).
The resulting judicial inquiry may, of course, address contentions of class-wide scope. But each such contention
stands or falls on its aJfplication to the named plaintiffs. For
example, the pretrial detention of the named plaintiffs may
be attacked on the ground that preventive detention of any
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juvenile is per se unconstitutional. Appellees have pressed
this argument below and continue to urge it here. They
argue that regardless of the charges against the juvenile, or
the juvenile's past record, he may not be preventively detained prior to an adjudication of the merits of the charges
against him. If sustained, this argument, while applying to
these particular plaintiffs, would apply equally to all class
members. If the statute is invalid as applied to the named
plaintiffs on this ground, it could not validly be applied to detain any juvenile before trial.
Appellees have also attacked the pretrial detention of the
named plaintiffs on the ground that the procedural safeguards contained in the New York statute, as applied by the
Family Court, are not adequate to authorize the detention
before trial of any juvenile charged with an offense. If this
argument were sustained, the necessary conclusion would be
that the named plaintiffs had been detained unconstitutionally. And, again, the rule derived from their case would invalidate the detention of any class member held under the
same procedures.
But the Court of Appeals did not hold that preventive detention of juveniles is per se unconstitutional or that the New
York procedures for authorizing pretrial detention are inadequate. The Court of Appeals in fact gave very little attention to the statutory standard and the procedural protections
which precede detention under § 320.5(3)(b). Instead, the
court essayed to look to the actual application of the statute
and to the percentage of "wrongful detentions" under it. 14
But in doing so, the court failed to address the fundamental
question of whether these particular plaintiffs had been constitutionally detained. As a consequence, the court's consid14
As noted , the Court of Appeals judged the percentage of wrongful detentions by the percentage of juveniles who "either have their petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after adjudication. " 689 F. 2d, at 369. We question the propriety of this equation in
Part 11l(C), infra.
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eration of statistics seems to us to have been wide of the
mark. However broad the rule to be derived from the consideration of the claims of the named plaintiffs, that rule must
first and foremost be applicable to the facts of the named
plaintiffs' cases.
III
We must, therefore, address the constitutionality of
§ 320.5(3)(b) by reference to claims properly raised by the

named parties to this action. T~~eparate though overlapping inquiries are necessary. ~ does preventive detention serve a legitimate state objective? See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 534 n. 15 (1979); K e n ~ .
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). ~ .
are the procedural safeguards specified in the New York
statute adequate to detain at least some juveniles charged
with offenses before trial? See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U. S. 319, 33~1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114
(1975). And
1r , were the particular circumstances surrounding the de ention of the three named plaintiffs such that
the New York procedures were const1tut10nally applied to
them?
The first two questions a ply equally to all members of the
class o~iuvem .§_S detained prior to tria , an , although it is
the cases of the named plaintiffs which raise these questions,
the answers do not depend upon the particular circumstances
of those cases. But if the first two questions are answered in
the affirmative, then the circumstances of the class representatives become the focus of the inquiry in answering the
third question. If one or more of those class representatives
is found to have been unconstitutionally detained on the facts
of his case, other class members may benefit only to the extent that they share the constitutionally relevant characteristics. Conversely, if none of the class representatives is
found tohavebeen unconstitutionallyaefamed on thefacts of
his case, thentiie" possibility that other class members may

l
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have been unconstitutionally detained cannot benefit the
three named plaintiffs or form a basis for class-wide relief.
A
Preventive detention under the Family Court Act is purportedly designed to protect the child and society from the
potential co'nsequences of his criminal acts. People ex rel.
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 521-522 (1976).
When making any detention decision, the Family Court judge
is specifically directed to consider the needs and best interests of the juvenile as well as the need for the protection of
the community. FCA §301.1; In re Craig S., 394 N. Y. S.
2d 200 (1977). In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 534 n. 15, we
left open the question whether any governmental objective
other than ensuring a detainee's presence at trial may constitutionally justify pretrial detention. As an initial matter,
therefore, we must decide whether, in the context of the juvenile system, the combined interest in protecting both the
community and the juvenile himself from the consequences of
future criminal conduct is sufficient to justify such detention.
The "legitimate and com elling state interest" in protecting the commum y om crime cannot be doubted. DeVeau
v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). See also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968). We have stressed before that
crime prevention is "a weighty social objective," Brown v.
Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979), and this interest persists undiluted in the juvenile context. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1,
20 n. 26 (1967). The harm suffered by the victim of a crime
is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator. 15 And the
harm to society generally may even be greater in this context
15
In 1982, juveniles under 16 accounted for 7.5 percent of all arrests for
violent crimes, 19.9 percent of all arrests for serious property crime, and
17. 3 percent of all arrests for violent and serious property crimes combined. 1982 Crime in the United States 176-177 (United States Dept. of
Justice) ("violent crimes" include murder, non-negligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault; "serious property crimes"
include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson).
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given the high rate of recidivisim among juveniles. In re
Gault, 387 U. S., at 22.
The juvenile's countervailing interest in freedom from institutional restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is
undoubtedly substantial as well. See In re Gault, 387 U. S.,
at 27. But that interest must be qualified by the recognition
that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services,
458 U. S. 502, 510-511 (1982); In re Gault, supra, at 17.
Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity
to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject
to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters,
the State must play its part as parens patriae. See State v.
Gleason, 404 A. 2d 573, 580 (Me. 1979); People ex rel.
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 522 (1976); Baker
v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d 149, 150-151 (Ky. App. 1971). In
this respect, the juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's "parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 766 (1982).
The New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the statute
at issue here, stressed at some length "the desirability of protecting the juvenile from his own folly." People ex rel.
Way burn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976). 16
"Our society recognizes that juveniles in general are in the earlier
stages of their emotional growth, that their intellectual development is
incomplete, that they have had only limited practical experience, and that
their value systems have not yet been clearly identified or firmly
adopted ....
"For the same reasons that our society does not hold juveniles to an
adult standard of responsibility for their conduct, our society may also conclude that there is a greater likelihood that a juvenile charged with delinquency, if released, will commit another criminal act than that an adult
charged with crime will do so. To the extent that self-restraint may be
expected to constrain adults, it may not be expected to operate with equal
force as to juveniles. Because of the possibility of juvenile delinquency
treatment and the absence of second-offender sentencing, there will not be
16

'
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Society has a legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from
the consequences of his criminal ,activity-both from potential physical injury which may be suffered when a victim
fights back or a policeman attempts to make an arrest and
from the downward spiral of criminal activity into which peer
pressure may lead the child. See L. 0. W. v. District Court
of Arapahoe, 623 P. 2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Colo. 1981); Morris
v. D'Amario, 416 A. 2d 137, 140 (R. I. 1980). See also
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115 (1982) (minority "is
a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage"); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979) (juveniles "often lack the
experience, perspective and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them").
The substantiality and legitimacy of the state interests underlying this statute are confirmed by the wide-spread use
and judicial acceptance of preventive detention for juveniles.
Every State, as well as the United States in the District of
Co'lumfoa, permits pr~entive detention ofjuveniles ac~used
of crime. 17 A number o1 model juvenile justice acts also con-

-

the deterrent for the juvenile which confronts the adult. Perhaps more
significant is the fact that in consequence of lack of experience and comprehension the juvenile does not view the commission of what are criminal acts
in the same perspective as an adult .... There is the element of gamesmanship and the excitement of 'getting away' with something and the powerful inducement of peer pressures. All of these commonly acknowledged
factors make the commission of criminal conduct on the part of juveniles in
general more likely than in the case of adults." People ex rel. Wayburn v.
Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976).
17
Ala. Code § 12--15--59 (1975); Alas. Stat. § 47.10.140 (1979); 17A Ariz.
Rev. Stats. Juv. Ct. Rules of Proc., rule 3 (1983--84 Supp.); Ark. Stat.
Ann, § 45--421 (1983 Supp.); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 628 (1984 Supp.);
Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19--2--102 (1983 Cum. Supp. ); Conn. Gen. Stats.
§ 46b-131 (198~ Supp.); Dela. Fam. Ct. Rule 60 (1981); D. C. Code
§ 16-2310 (1981 ); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.032 (1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 15--11-19
(1982); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 571-31.1 (1982 Supp.); Idaho Code § 16-1811
(1983 Supp.); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 703--4 (198~ Supp.); Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 31--6--4--5 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.22 (1983--84
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tain provisions permitting preventive detention. 18 And the
courts of eight States, including the New York Court of Appeals, have upheld their statutes with specific reference to
protecting the juvenile and the community from harmful pretrial conduct, including pretrial crime. L.O. W. v. District
Supp.); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1632 (1982 Cum. Supp.); Ky. Rev. Stats.
§ 208.192 (1982); La. Code J uv. Proc. Art. 40 (1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, § 3203 (1983--84 Supp.); Md. Ann. Code § 3--815 (1983 Cum. Supp.);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 66 (1983 Supp.); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 712A.15 (1983--84 Supp.); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.171 (1982); Miss. Code
Ann. § 43-23-11 (1981); Mo. R. Juv. Ct. 111.02 (1981); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 41-5--305 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-255 (1982 Cum. Supp.); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 62.140 (1983); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169B:14 (1983 Cum. Supp.);
N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-56 (1983-84 Supp.); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-24
(1981 Supp.); N. Y. FCA § 320.5(3) (1983); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-574
(1981); N. D. Cent. Code §27-20-14 (1974); Ohio Rev. Code Ann., tit. 21,
ch. 2151.311 (1978); Okla. Stat. Ann. ch. 10, § 1107 (1983--84 Supp.); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 419.573 (1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6325 (1982); R. I. Gen. Laws
§§ 14-1-20, 21 (1981); S. C. Code Ann. § 20-7-600 (1983 Cum. Supp.); S. D.
Code § 26-8-19.2 (1983 Supp.); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-214 (1983 Supp.);
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.02 (1982-83 Supp.); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-30
(1983 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §643 (1981); Va. Code Ann.§ 16.1-248
(1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.040 (1983--84 Cum. Supp.); W. Va.
Code Ann. § 49-5--8 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 48.208 (1983-84
Supp.); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-206 (1977).
18
See United States Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Standards for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, Report of the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention (U. S. Gov. Printing Office, July 1980), at
294-296; Uniform Juvenile Court Act, § 14, 9A U. L. A. (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-1968); Standard Juvenile
Court Act, Art. IV, § 16, proposed by the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency (6th Ed. 1959); W. Sheridan, Legislative Guide for Drafting
Family and Juvenile Court Acts,§ 20(a)(l) (Dept. of HEW, Children's Bureau, Pub. No. 472-1969); see also Standards for Juvenile and Family
Courts, at 62-63 (Dept. of HEW, Children's Bureau, Pub. No. 437-1966).
Cf. Institute of Judicial Administration/American Bar Association Juvenile
Justice Standards Relating to Interim Status: The Release, Control, and
Detention of Accused Juvenile Offenders Between Arrest and Disposition
3.2B (detention limited to . "reducing the likelihood that the juvenile may
inflict serious bodily harm on others during the interim").
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Court of Arapahoe, 623 P. 2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Colo. 1981);
Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A. 2d 137, 139-140 (R. I. 1980);
State v. Gleason, 404 A. 2d 573, 583 (Me. 1979); Pauley v.
Gross, 574 P. 2d 234, 237-238 (Kan. App. 1977); People ex
rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976);
Aubrey v. Gadbois, 123 Cal. Reptr. 365, 366 (CA App. 1975);
Baker v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d 149, 150-151 (Ky. App. 1971);
Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal v. Hendrick, 265 A. 2d 348,
349-350 (Pa. 1970).
"The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of
states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934)." Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 798 (1952). In light of the uniform legislative
judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles properly promotes the interests both of society and the juvenile, we conclude that the practice serves a legitimate regulatory purpose
compatible with the "fundamental fairness" demanded by the
Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings. Cf. M cKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 548 (1971) (plurality
opinion). 19
19
Appellees argue that some limit must be placed on the categories of
crimes that detained juveniles must be accused of having committed or
being likely to commit. But the discretion to delimit the categories of
crimes justifying detention, like the discretion to define criminal offenses
and prescribe punishments, resides wholly with the state legislatures.
Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 689 (1980); Rochin v. California,
342 U. S. 165, 168 (1952). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275
(1980) ("the presence or absence of violence does not always affect the
strength of society's interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing
a particular criminal").
More fundamentally, in the instant case, the named plaintiffs have no
standing to raise the claims of juveniles accused of "minor" crimes. Appellee Martin was charged with first-degree robbery, second-degree assault
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Of course, the mere invocation of a legitimate purpose will
not justify particular restrictions and conditions of confinement amounting to punishment. It is axiomatic that "[d]ue
process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished."
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 535 n. 16. Even given, therefore, that pretrial detention may serve legitimate regulatory
purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether the terms
and conditions of confinement under § 320.5(3)(b) are in fact
compatible with those purposes. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). "A court must decide
whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose." Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538.
Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the
part of the State, that determination generally will turn on
"whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction]
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it.]" Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, at
168-189. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538; Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 613-614 (1960).
There is no indication in the statute itself that preventive
detention is used or intended as a punishment. First of all,
the detention is strictly limited in time. If a juvenile is detained at his initial appearance and has denied the charges
against him, he is entitled to a probable cause hearing to be
held not more than three days after the conclusion of the initial appearance or four days after the filing of the petition,
whichever is sooner. FCA § 325.1(2). 20 If the Family Court
and criminal possession of a loaded revolver. Appellee Rosario was
charged with attempted first-degree robbery and second-degree assault.
He had pending another delinquency petition for stabbing a student. Appellee Morgan was charged with attempted robbery and attempted grand
larceny. It was his fifth arrest, and he had another delinquency petition
pending for robbery and criminal possession of stolen property.
20
For good cause shown, the court may adjourn the hearing, but for no
more than three additional court days. FCA § 325.1(3).
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judge finds probable cause, he must also determine whether
continued detention is necessary pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b).
Id., at §325.3(3).
Detained juveniles are also entitled to an expedited factfinding hearing. If the juvenile is charged with one of a limited number of designated felonies, the fact-finding hearing
must be scheduled to commence not more than fourteen days
after the conclusion of the initial appearance. Id., at § 340.1.
If the juvenile is charged with a lesser offense, then the factfinding hearing must be held not more than three days after
the initial appearance. 21 In the latter case, since the time for
the probable cause hearing and the fact-finding hearing coincide, the two hearings are merged.
Thus, the maximum possible detention under § 320.5(3)(b)
of a youth accused of a serious crime, assuming a three-day
extension of the fact-finding hearing for good cause shown, is
seventeen days. The maximum detention for less serious
crimes, again assuming a three-day extension for good cause
shown, is six days. These time-frames seem suited to the
limited purpose of providing the youth with a controlled environment and separating him from improper influences pending the speedy disposition of his case.
The conditions of confinement also appear to reflect the
regulatory purposes relied upon by the State. When a juvenile is remanded after his initial appearance, he cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, be sent to a prison or lockup
where he would be exposed to adult criminals. FCA
§ 304.1(2). Instead, the child is screened by an "assessment
unit" of the Department of Juvenile Justice. Testimony of
Mr. Kelly (Deputy Commissioner of Operations, New York
City Department of Juvenile Justice), J. A., at 286-287.
The assessment unit places the child in either nonsecure or
secure detention. Nonsecure detention involves an open
In either case, the court may adjourn the hearing for not more than
three days for good cause shown. FCA § 340.1(3). The court must state
on the record the reason for any adjournment. Id., at §340.1(4).
21
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facility in the community, a sort of "halfway house," without
locks, bars or security officers where the child receives
schooling and counseling and has access to recreational facilities. Id., at 285; Testimony of Mr. Benjamin, J. A., at
149-150.
Secure detention is more restrictive, but it is still consistent with the regulatory and paren·s patriae objectives relied
upon by the State. Children are assigned to separate dorms
based on age, size and behavio-r. They wear street clothes
provided by the institution and partake in educational and
recreational programs and counselling sessions run by
trained social workers. Misbehavior is punished by confinement to one's room. See Testimony of Mr. Kelly, J. A., at
292-297. We cannot conclude from this record that the
controlled environment briefly imposed by the State on juveniles in secure pretrial detention "is imposed for the purpose
of punishment" rather than as "an incident of some other
legitimate government purpose." Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U. S., at 538.
B
Given the legitimacy of the State's interest in preventive
detention, and the nonpunitive nature of that detention, the
~ is wh~ the procedures afforded juveniles
ed pr10r to fact finding provide sufficient rotection
against erroneous an unnecessary eprivations of liberty.
Seet-Matnews v.Elariage, 2124 CT. S:-3I9, 335 -C-1976). In
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975), we held that a
judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to
any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of
crime. We did not, however, mandate a specific time-table.
Nor did we require the "full panoply of adversary safeguards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process of witnesses." Id., at 119. Instead, we recognized "the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by
the States." Id., at 123. Gerstein arose under the Fourth
Amendment, but the same concern with "flexibility" and "in-
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formality," while yet ensuring adequate predetention procedures, is present in this context. In re Winship, 397 U. S.
358, 366 (1970); Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 554
(1966).
In many respects, the Family Court Act provides far more
predetention protection for juveniles than we found to be
constitut10na require for a u ts m erstein. The initial
appearance is informa , u
e accused juvenile is given full
notice of the charges against him and a complete stenographic record is kept of the hearing. See 513 F. Supp., at
702. The juvenile appears accompanied by his parent or
guardian. 22 He is first informed of his rights, including the
right to remain silent and the right to be represented by
counsel chosen by him or by a law guardian assigned by the
court. FCA § 320.3. The initial appearance may be adjourned for no longer than 72 hours or until the next court
day, whichever is sooner, to enable an appointed law guardian or other counsel to appear before the court. Id., at
§ 320.2(3). When his counsel is present, the juvenile is informed of the charges against him and furnished with a copy
of the delinquency petition. Id., at § 320.4(1). A representative from the presentment agency appears in support of the
petition.
The nonhearsay allegations in the delinquency petition and
supporting depositions must establish probable cause to believe the juvenile committed the offense. Although the
Family Court judge is not required to make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance, the youth may challenge
the sufficiency of the petition on that ground. FCA § 315.1.
Thus, the juvenile may oppose any recommended detention
by arguing that there is not probable cause to believe he committed the offense or offenses with which he is charged. If
22
If the juvenile's parent or guardian fails to appear after reasonable and
substantial efforts have been made to notify such person, the court must
appoint a law guardian for the child. FCA § 320.3.
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the petition is not dismissed, the juvenile is given an opportunity to admit or deny the charges. Id., at § 321.1. 23
At the conclusion of the initial appearance, the presentment agency makes a recommendation regarding detention.
A probation officer reports on the juvenile's record, including
other prior and current Family Court and probation contacts,
as well as relevant information concerning home life, school
attendance, and any special medical or developmental problems. He concludes by offering his agency's recommendation on detention. Opposing counsel, the juvenile's parents,
and the juvenile himself may all speak on his behalf and challenge any information or recommendation. If the judge does
decide to detain the juvenile under § 320.5(3)(b), he must
state on the record the facts and reasons for the detention. 24
As noted, a detained juvenile is entitled to a formal, adversarial probable cause hearing within three days of his initial
appearance, with one three-day extension possible for good
If the child chooses to remain silent, he is assumed to deny the charges.
FCA § 321.1. With the consent of the court and of the presentment
agency, the child may admit to a lesser charge. If he wishes to admit to
the charges or to a lesser charge, the court must, before accepting the admission, advise the child of his right to a fact-finding hearing and of the
possible specific dispositional orders that may result from the admission.
Ibid. The court must also satisfy itself that the child actually did commit
the acts to which he admits. Ibid.
With the consent of the victim or complainant and the juvenile, the court
may also refer a case to the probation service for adjustment. If the case
is subsequently adjusted , the petition is then dismissed. Id., at§ 320.6.
24
Given that under Gerstein , 420 U. S. , at 119-123, a probable cause
hearing may be informal and nonadversarial, a Family Court judge could
make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance. That he is not
required to do so does not, under the circumstances, amount to a deprivation of due process. Notice, an opportunity for a hearing, and a statement
of facts and reasons are sufficient to meet the requirements of fundamental
fairness. Kent v. United States , 383 U. S. 541, 557 (1966). Appellees fail
to point to a single example where probable cause was not found after a
decision was made to detain the child.
23

I
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cause shown. 25 The burden at this hearing is on the presentment agency to call witnesses and offer evidence in support of
the charges. Id., at § 325.2. Testimony is under oath and
subject to cross-examination. Ibid. The accused juvenile
may call witnesses and offer evidence in his own behalf. If
the court finds probable cause, the court must again decide
whether continued detention is necessary under§ 320.5(3)(b).
Again, the facts and reasons for the detention must be stated
on the recor,d.
In sum/'ii"otice, a~ring, and atsfatement of facts and reaL,,-soiis'are given prior to any detention under § 320.5(3)(b). A
formal pro able cause earing 1s then held within a short
while thereafter, if the fact-finding hearing is not itself scheduled within three days. These flexible procedures are constitutionally adequate, whether the inquiry be phrased as one
under the Fourth Amendment, see Gerstein v. Pugh, or
under the Due Process Clause, see Kent v. Ufejt, ed States, 383
u. s. 541, 557.
Appellees argue, however, that the risk of erroneous and
unnecessary detentions is too high despite these procedures
because the standard for detention is fatally vague. Detention under § 320.5(3)(b) is based on a finding that there is a
"serious risk" that the juvenile, if released, would commit a
crime prior to his next court appearence. We have already
seen that detention of juveniles on that ground serves legitimate regulatory purposes. But appellees claim, and the district court agreed, that it is virtually impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy.
Moreover, they say, the statutory standard fails to channel
the discretion of the Family Court judge by specifying the
25
The Court in Gerstein indicated approval of pretrial detention procedures that supplied a probable cause hearing within five days of the initial
detention. 420 U. S. , at 124 n. 25. The brief delay in the probable cause
hearing may actually work to the advantage of the juvenile since it gives
his counsel, usually appointed at the initial appearance pursuant to FCA
§ 320.2(2), time to prepare.
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factors on which he should rely in making that prediction.
The procedural protections noted above are thus, in their
view, unavailing because the ultimate decision is intrinsically
arbitrary and uncontrolled.
Our cases indicate, however, that there is nothing inher- 1
ently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct. Such a judgment forms an important element in many
decisions, 26 and we have specifically rejected the contention,
based on the same sort of sociological data relied upon by appellees and the district court, "that it is impossible to predict
future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be
meaningless." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, 'and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 279
(WHITE, J., concurring).
We have also recognized that a prediction of future criminal conduct is "an experienced prediction based on a host of
variables" which cannot be readily codified. Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 16 (1979). Judge Quinones of the Family Court testifed at trial that he and his col26
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274-275 (1976) (death sentence imposed by jury); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 9-10
(1979) (grant of parole); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972) (parole revocation).
A prediction of future criminal conduct may also form the basis for an
increased sentence under the "dangerous special offender" statute, 18
U. S. C. § 3575 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Under§ 3575(f), a "dangerous" offender is defined as an individual for whom "a period of confinement longer
than that provided for such [underlying] felony is required for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant." The
statute has been challenged numerous times on the grounds that the standard is unconstitutionally vague. Every Court of Appeals considering the
question has rejected that claim. United States v. Davis, 710 F. 2d 104,
108-109 (CA3), cert. denied, - - U. S. - - (1983); United States v.
Schell, 692 F. 2d 672, 675-676 (CAlO 1982); United States v. Williamson,
567 F. 2d 610, 613 (CA4 1977); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F. 2d 1160,
1175 (CA5 1977); United States v. NeanJ, 552 F. 2d 1184, 1194 (CA7), cert.
denied, 434 U. S. 864 (1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F. 2d 326,
336-337 (CA6), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 922 (1976).
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leagues make a determination under § 320.5(3)(b) based on
numerous factors including the nature and seriousness of the
charges; whether the charges are likely to be proved at trial;
the juvenile's prior record; the adequacy and effectiveness of
his home supervision; his school situation, if known; the time
of day of the alleged crime as evidence of its seriousness and
a possible lack of parental control; and any special circumstances that might be brought to his attention by the probation officer, the child's attorney, or any parents, relatives or
other responsible persons accompanying the child. Testimony of Judge Quinones, J. A., at 254-267. The decision is
based on as much information as can reasonably be obtained
at the initi~ e,ppearance. lb~
Given t~ ght t~ he~rin~
counsel and to a statement
of ~
ns, ther e is no reason that the specific factors upon
which the Family CourtJuage- might reTy must be specified in
the -::----.
statute. As the NewYork Cou rt of Appeals concluded,
People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 522
(1976), "to a very real extent Family Court must exercise a
substitute parental control for which there can be no particularized criteria." There is also no reason, we should add, for
a federal court to assume that a state court judge will not
strive to apply state law as conscientiously as possible.
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 549 (1981).
·.··.· C

I

As noted , the Court of Appeals concluded that the underlying purpose of § 320.5(3)(b) was punitive, not regulatory.
But the court did not dispute that preventive detention may
serve legitimate regulatory purposes or that the terms and
conditions of confinement were compatible with those purposes. Nor did it find that New York failed to provide adequate predetention procedures. The Court of Appeals invalidated a significant aspect of New York's juvenile justice
system based solely on some case histories and a statistical
study which appeared to show that "the vast majority of ju-
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veniles detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] either have their petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are
released after adjudication." 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court
assumed that dismissal of a petition or failure to confine a juvenile at the dispositional hearing belied the need to detain
him prior to fact finding and that, therefore, the pretrial detention constituted punishment.
In light of our observations earlier in this opinion, the most
obvious flaw in the Court of Appeals' analysis of the punitive
nature of pretria1detention is its-failureto focus on the circumstances in which the nameclpa:rties were detained. With
respect to those partieDlie ou o ppeals reasoning simply does not wash. Even if regular dismissals of charges in
other cases might lend support to the inference that in those
cases pretrial detention was imposed for an improper purpose, that fact could not aid appellees Martin, Rosario and
Morgan or other similarly situated class members.
Kenneth Morgan was arrested and charged with attempted
robbery and attempted grand larceny while he was on release
status on another robbery charge. It was his fifth arrest,
and his mother refused to come to court because he had been
in trouble so often she did not want him home. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3a, at 3. At his initial appearance, Morgan was
appointed counsel and notified of the charges against him.
Counsel spoke on his behalf, arguing against detention; but in
light of the prior arrests and the lack of parental supervision,
Morgan was detained.
Under the circumstances, we can find no due process violation in the decision of the Family Court judge to detain Morgan under § 320.5(3)(b). Nor does the subsequent disposition of his case indicate that the pretrial detention was
employed as a substitute for postadjudication punishment.
Morgan was detained for eight days pending completion of
his fact-finding hearing, at which time he was adjudicated a
delinquent. He Was ordered placed with the Department of
Social Services for eighteen months.
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Gregory Martin was charged with first-degree robbery,
second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon.
He had no prior record, but he was carrying a loaded revolver when arrested and he lied to the police about where he
lived. Given the seriousness of the charges and the lateness
of the hour at which the crime occurred, the Family Court
judge ordered Martin detained. Again, we can find no violation of due process in that decision and no indication that the
pretrial detention was either intended or employed as a
punishment.
Martin was detained for five days before his probable cause
hearing and for ten more days pending completion of the fact
finding. He was found guilty on two counts, adjudicated a
delinquent and placed on two years' probation. Thus, Martin was not detained following his adjudication as a delinquent. ·But pretrial detention should not be considered punitive merely because a juvenile is subsequently discharged
subject to conditions or put on probation. In fact, such actions reinforce the original finding that close supervision of
the juvenile is required. 27 Lenient but supervised disposition is in keeping with the Act's purpose to promote the
welfare and development of the child. 28 As the New York
Court of Appeals noted:

"It should surprise no one that caution and concern for
both the juvenile and society may indicate the more conservative decision to detain at the very outset, whereas
the later development of very much more relevant information may prove that while a finding of delinquency
The Court of Appeals, by contrast, treated probation and releases subject to conditions as equivelent to unconditional discharges. 689 F. 2d, at
372-373.
28
Judge Quinones testified that detention at disposition is considered a
"harsh solution." At the dispositional hearing, the Family Court judge
usually has "a much more complete picture of the youngster" and tries to
tailor the least restrictive dispositional order compatible with that picture.
Testimony of Judge Quinones, J. A., at 279-281.
27
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was warranted, placement would not be indicated."
People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518,
522 (1976).
Appellee Rosario, in contrast to both Martin and Morgan,
was not ultimately adjudicated a delinquent. In fact, his
case was terminated prior to fact finding. But we still cannot conclude that the decision to detain him pursuant to
§ 320.5(3)(b) amounted to a due process violation. A delinquency petition may be dismissed for any number of reasons
collateral to its merits, such as the failure of a witness to
testify. 29 The Family Court judge cannot be expected to
anticipate such developments at the initial hearing. He
must make his decision based on the information available to
him at that time, and the propriety of his decision must be
judged in that light. Consequently, the final disposition of a
case is "largely irrelevant" to the legality of a pretrial detention. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 145 (1979).
There are ample grounds in the Record to support the decision to detain Rosario. He was charged with attempted
first-degree robbery and second-degree assault. A firearm
was involved in the incident, and the victims were beaten
with sticks. Rosario had another delinquency petition pending for stabbing a student, and two prior petitions had been
adjusted. The Family Court judge specifically relied on
these repeated criminal acts and the danger of further crimes
in ordering Rosario's detention.
With respect to each of these three cases, the question is
not whether the decision to aetain was the wisest possible
~e--1- but only 'whether it was compatible with due process.
Given the regulatory purpose for the detention of' the named
parties, the procedural protections that were accorded them,
and the lack of any indication in the Record that the detentions were either intended or employed as punishment, we
conclude that they were not unconstitutionally detained pur29

The Record does not disclose why Rosario's case was terminated.
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suant to §320.5(3)(b). It may be that New York Family
Court judges have detained juveniles in other circumstances
that would not pass constitutional muster. But the validity
of those detentions must be adjudicated on a case-by-case
basis. The Court of Appeals' approval of the wholesale release of juveniles detained under§ 320.5(3)(b) without regard
to individual circumstances-without even mentioning the
circumstances surrounding the detention of the three named
parties to this case-is contrary to well-established principles
of constitutional adjudication. See United States v. Raines,
362 u. s. 17, 21 (1960).
It is worth adding that the Court of Appeals was also mistaken in its conclusion that "individual litigation . . . is a practical impossibility because the periods of detention are so
short that the litigation is mooted before the merits are determined." 689 F. 2d, at 373. In fact, one of the juveniles
in the very case histories upon which the court relied was released from pretrial detention on a writ of habeas corpus issued by the state Supreme Court. New York courts also
have adopted a liberal view of the doctrine of "capable of repetition, yet evading review" precisely in order to ensure that
pretrial detention orders are not unreviewable. In People
ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 519-520
(1976), the court declined to dismiss an appeal from the grant
of a writ of habeas corpus despite the technical mootness of
the case.
"Because the situation is likely to recur ... and the substantial issue may otherwise never be reached (in view of
the predictably recurring happenstance that, however
expeditiously an appeal might be prosecuted, fact finding
and dispositional hearings normally will have been held
and a disposition made before the appeal could reach
us), ... we decline to dismiss [the appeal] on the ground
of mootness."
The required statement of facts and reasons justifying the
detention and the stenographic record of the initial appear-
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ance will provide a basis for the review of individual cases.
Pretrial detention orders in New York may be reviewed by
writ of habeas corpus brought in state Supreme Court. And
the judgment of that court is appealable as of right and may
be taken directly to the Court of Appeals if a constitutional
question is presented. N. Y. Civil Practice Law§ 5601(b)(2)
(1978). Permissive appeal from a Family Court order may
also be had to the appellate division. FCA § 365.2. Or a
motion for reconsideration may be directed to the Family
Court judge. Id., at § 355. l(l)(b). These postdetention
procedures provide a sufficient mechanism for correcting on a
case-by-case basis any erroneous detentions ordered under
§ 320.5(3). Such procedures can also be expected to establish more specific guidelines for detention, fashioned to fit
concrete situations, that will better inform the discretion of
Family Court judges.
IV
The question before us is not whether a better preventive
detention system could be devised, but only whether this system, as applied to the class representatives in this case, comports with constitutional standards. Given the regulatory
purpose for the detention and the procedural protections that
preceded its imposition, we conclude that the detention of the
three named plaintiffs was not mvahd under the Due'Process
Clause of the Fourteemli" Amencl'merit:"_______
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

r

./

,r

Reversed.
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I will await the dissent.
Sincerely,
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Dear Bill:
This is a tough case, I will wait for Thurgood's
dissent.
Respectfully,
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Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Re:

Joe
Nos. 82-1248

&

82-1278 Schall v. Martin

I think Justice Rehnquist's opinion has fairly serious flaws,
and I do not recommend joining it, at least in its entirety.
basic problem is

that the opinion avoids the factor

The

that makes

this a difficult case and that was most persuasive to the lower

--

-

t,'\

court:

the

1

number

of

juveniles preventively detained

detained.

!ttatistics

that

show a

great disparity
and

between

those

:.>

~
~

the

ultimately .bl-

_,_

The plaintiffs' central argument is that that dispari- ~

ty shows that the state is either acting irrationally in protect~ ,
ing the community for only a few days, has too high an error rate

~-'·--

?

in identifying those to be detained, or is in fact punishing the
juveniles without adequate procedures.
of the majority's decision below.

This was also the basis

Moreover, in refusing to look

at those statistics, the opinion reaches out--unnecessarily, as I
\ '\

see i t--to decide a~ issue ir?fclas_s action law without any briefc---

ing and without it being presented in the Jurisdictional Statement.
With apologies
three points.~
acti ~

for

the length of this memo,

I want to make

I think the opinion's holding on the ~ lass

sue may be wrong. ~

I think it is unnecessary to

reach that issue in this case in order to avoid looking to the
plain~1ffs'

statistics, because the statistics should be consid-

ered even in addressing the named plaintiffs' individual claims.

page 2.

Finally, I think the same result can be reached even if you look
to the statistics.

-

1.

The reason WHR does not address the L~tatistical showin~ '

is that he would hold that "the characteristics of the unnamed
members of a class which are not shared by the named members of
the class cannot enlarge the legal issues presented to the court
by the named par ties."

P.

11.

The thrust of the ruling is to

disable the unnamed plaintiffs from mounting a challenge to the
statute as applied to them.

The source of this rule, and why it

can be raised to bar claims at this point in the litigation, is
unclear.

WH_.g menti..ons "cases and controversies" on page 10, sug-

--------

gesting that it is a constitutional rule of standing.
p.

~-------n.

18,

(His clerk confirms that that

19.

getting at.)

and

is what they are

The cases WHR cites on page 11 do not fully support

the proposition
Iodriguez

See also

advanced.

Raines

Falcon are cases

is

not a

class action case.

turning on whether

a class was

properly certified under Rule 23.
'!here is no question that the representativeness of the named
plaintiffs is central to a Rule 23 inquiry, but I am not sure it
can be elevated to a constitutional or

jurisdictional question,

which is essential if the Court is to consider the question sua
sponte.

The logic of cases dealing specifically with the consti-

tutional limits on class actions suggest that the unnamed plaintiffs have standing for purposes of Art.
named ,plaintiffs.

III independent of the

I have in mind a series of cases in which the

named plaintiffs' claims became moot during the litigation--~,
they were offered reinstatement and back pay,

or

they got their

page 3.

divorce in another state.
dismiss the actions.

When that happened, this Court did not

Rather,

"[a] 1 though the named representa-

ti ve no longer had a personal stake in the outcome," the Court
held that "' [w]hen the District Court certified the propriety of
the class action,

the class of unnamed persons described in the
...,

certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest
asserted

by

[the named

representative],'

'cases and controversies'

.
· · a• "
tut1on
was sat1sf1e
747,

753

(1975)).

(1976)

and,

accordingly,

the

requirement of Art. III of the Consti-

vFranks v.·

{quoting ~ osna

Bowman Transp.
v.

Iowa,

Co.,
U.S.

419

424

U.S.

393,

399

The reason the class certification satisfied Art.

III

requirements was that it ensured the "concrete adverseness" that
Id., at 755.

the Constitution requires.
examining

the progress of

This was confirmed by

litigation itself, which showed that

the status of the unnamed class members had been a central part
of the trial.
193-194 (1977)

Id., at 756.

Cf. Craig v.

Boren,

429 U.S.

190,

{similar rule in jus tertii cases).

If this logic is applied to a case in which it develops that
class representatives do not-- completely represent the interests
of the unnamed class, it would seem that the only Art. III limitation on considering the arguably separate claims of the unnamed

______________________________ __ ___

representatives of

the class

is "concrete adverseness."

Yet I

...:- class
._:.
:.:.:;....
have little doubt that the interests of the unnamed
members
,...,

ore the Court.

are suffici
34 cape

histories,

~

which

reflect

a

far

~

wider

there are the

variety of cases

than the three cases to which WHR feels limited ~

there

page 4 •

.
are the statistics, which show what happened to the class members
as a group.
At bottom, what bothers me about the class action holding is
that it invests with constitutional significance which members of
the class the plaintiffs choose as their class representatives.
This "second-class status" for unnamed class members appears to
be without precedent as a constitutional matter.
matter,
courts

As a practical
--------------sure that it is such a good idea for appellate

I am not

to examine whether

the named plaintiffs truly represent

the class in every particular, regardless of whether the common('

ality of interests is challenged under Rule 23.
.

The result will

.

be that the captions of class actions will grow increasingly long
as plainti:-ffs seek ' to anticipate every possible distinction that
some court along the way may come up with.

It seems more orderly

to let these essentially procedural matters rest in the District
Court.

0 1

--

do not pretend that I

':::----

am

cert.ain- of all of the above.

WHR's proposed rule makes some sense (particularly as a matter of ~
Rule 23) •

But in the absence of briefing I would not reach it

unless it is necessary.

-------------

4-~

I do not think it is in this case.

~

The main purpose of the class action holding appears to be to
avoid looking to the statistics
been applied to the class).

(which show how the statute has

But the statistics are in any case

relevant to the challenges that WHR acknowledges are before the
Court.

He agrees that ~he plaintiffs can attack the statute "on

------lied

its face" and as a
~

to ' the three named plaintiffs.

~

Pp.

2-

acial attack ~sks whether New York's scheme has a nonpu-

page 5.

nitive rationale and whether there are sufficient procedures to
protect against erroneous deprivations.

It is certainly persua-

sive

procedures provided are

in such

a

facial

attack

that

the

insufficient because they tend to result in too high a number of
"erroneous" detentions.
ni tive rationale

for

It also is important to finding a nonpu-

the stacute that the vast majority of de-

tainees are eventually released, both in New York and nationwide.
'Ihis makes
seem

the

suggested

insubstantial. 1

distinctly

heavily

on

the

striking down

statistics

the

See J.A. 97, 114.
tics

and

case

rationale of protecting

and

statute on

Thus,
appears

its

face,

the
to

the community

lower
have

court

relied

thought

it was

as well as as applied.

Finally, WHR himself admits that "such statis-

histories may

illuminate

the

application of

the

statute to the named parties," p. 10, but he never mentions them
again.
My point is that even were this an attack on the statute by
only the three named plaintiffs, they could introduce the statis-

l

1 Put another way, the figures confirm what on its face
appears to be a central _problem in the statute. The statute
provides different standards for detaining juveniles--at which
time the court is to consider the "need to protect the community-and for final disposition-~at which time the court also is to
consider the best interests of ·the · child.
The plaintiffs argue
that this suggests that the state's interest in protecting the
community is in fact marginal.
The statistics support the claim,
since the different standards appear to contribute to the very
different results obtained at the two stages. The lower court
?,It it this way: "The incongruities of the statutory scheme yield
a paradoxical result in practice." J.A. 102.
WijR does not mention the different standards--he relies on a
section of the statute providing that the Family Court is always
supposed to consider the best interests of the child--and ignores
the showing that the difference may be important.

page 6.

tics relied on below and those statistics would bear on the validity of the statutory standards and procedures.
3.

Finally,

I do not think the statistics necessarily mean

that the statute must fall.

It is the opinion's narrow approach

that I now am quarreling with, not its result.
make

it a

closer case.

The statistics do

'----------

They make

it plain that the statutory

nuances that WHR ignores, see note 1 supra, are of major importance.
ple

on

They also make clear that the "errors" in detaining peelittle

information

that WHR brushes

III(C) are endemic to the system.

aside

.....,

for

----

Part

-

That is, it
------,

juveniles generally that

--------------~,__.. - ---

his

lotf/(.5

Nevertheless, the answers that

he gives also can serve to answer the statistics.

--------the caution and concern

in

~
is ~

~

justifies

~
information is obtained. ~ '

--------

the state in detaining them until more

In addition, this remedy appears to be universally thought of as

\/)._)~

(The trouble

necessary. and consistent with fundamental justice.

is that that does not explain why the statute applies two different standards at the two stages in the proceeding.
supra.

See note 1,

That problem is probably explained by the quite different

point that evidence on what is in the best interests of the child
is more difficult to gather than evidence on whether the community needs protection.)
4.

To summarize, I find WHR's holding on the nature of class

actions questionable and unnecessary.

--------------.

opinion's

general

refusal

to deal

I also am disturbed by the

head

on with

the

fact

that

under,the statutory scheme the community is only protected from

-

crime for~

riod_ before trial in most cases.

(There are oth-

'

er less important problems, such as the application of Mathews v.

page 7.

Eldridge

(your

does

appear

not

op.)

to

to go

this case
through

in Part

II(B);

the balancing

of

WHR's opinion
the costs and

benefits of further procedures that that case envisions, but instead looks to see whether certain minimum standards are satisf ied.)

If you agree with me--particularly on the first point--!

suspect you will have to write something separately.

'"' - - - - - - - -

For now, we

can either wait for the dissent, which may make the class action
point (as well as the Mathews one) for us, or we can go ahead and
set out these views in a separate concurrence now.

March 19, 1984

82-1248 and 82-1274 Schall v. Martin

Dear Bill:
Over the weekend I read your opinion - all 3l
pages. You have the right answer, and I aqree with most of
what you have written. I do have some questions.

,

Both of the courts below decided the case on the
basis of the wide disparitv, shown by statiRtics, between
the number of juveniles detained for brief periods and those
ultimately found to be detainable. It seems to me that your
opinion does not address the principal argument of respondents and the grounds uoon which the case was decided by both
courts below.

If I understand your opinion correctly, you justify this implicitly by treating the case as if it w~re not a
class action. On page 10 you suggest that the case presents
a constitutional question of standing. See also p. 18, n.
19 . This issue was not argued or addressed below, nor
raised in the Jurisdictional Statement here. I am not sure
that it must be viewed as a constitutional or jurisdictional
question in this case. Perhaps I am wrong, but I have understood that for constitutional purpose once the class was
duly certified, the class itself retained legal status without regard to what happened to the claims of the named representatives. ~his at any rate was the rule in the mootness
cases.
In any event, unless the Court is willing to hold
aR a jurisdictional matter that the separate claims of the
unnamed class members arP. not before the Court, I see no
reason to address the is~ue at all.
Also, I would meet what may be described as the
•
"statistical
issue" head on, and hold the statute valid.

,,

·-,

2.

Contrary to the view of CA2, the statistics do not show that
the statute has a punitive rationale. It is generally similar to juvenile detention statutes in other states. In
those states, as in New York, protection of the public is
not the only or perhaps even the primary purpose. In my
view, the statute reflects thA com~~l.ling interest of the
state in the welfare of iuveniles. Further, there are no
additional procedures that would change the operati.on of the
statute siqnificantly without unduly impinging on the
achievement of legitimate state purposes.
I will understand, of course, if you prefer not to
make substantial chanqes along the foreqoinq lines. I will
then write a separate opinion, joining what I can of your
opinion ann the iudqment.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

cc:

The Conference

JJuprtmt <1,I47Url irf fJrt ~ b .Btau•
-ufrington. ~- C!f. 20~'1,
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 20, 1984

Re:

No. 82-1248)
82-1274)

Schall v. Martin
Abrams v. Martin

Dear Lewis:
Thanks for your letter of March 19th about my op1n1on in
this case. It was one of those conference votes where the
majority to "reverse" did not fully agree on one line of
reasoning, and the drafter of the opinion was left to put
something together as best he could.
I do not think that the opinion refuses to treat the
case as a class action; certainly for mootness purposes the
certification of a class keeps a claim alive, and the claim
is alive here. The point I try to make in my opinion -- and
I think it is a justifiable one -- is that even though a
class was certified, the named plaintiffs must adequately
represent that class; that is, a court's focus should not be
on idiosyncrasies of unnamed members of the class not shared
by the named plaintiffs. For example, respondent's counsel
in oral argument tried to argue that the typical detainee
was a "three card monte" player; it was pointed out to him
that the named plaintiffs in this case had all been arrested
for far more serious offenses. I think that some of the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this case was extremely
loose, and that part of the looseness stems from its failure
to focus on these plaintiffs.
Having said this, I certainly have no objection to
dealing with the statistics relied on by the Court of
Appeals; indeed, I think that to do so would strengthen the
opinion. I agree fully with your paragraph devoted to this
issue, and I would be happy to incorporate it and expand
upon it in my opinion.

-
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In short, I am willing to tone down to some extent my
. emphasis on the failure of the Court of Appeals to address
the situations of the named plaintiffs, rather than the
abstract qualities of the class as a whole, and I am more
than willing to fully treat the statistical argument. I do
want to retain some of the language about the failure of the
Court of Appeals to focus on the character of the named
plainitffs, because I think this failure was part of the
reason that the Court of Appeals went astray. If these
sorts of changes would be sufficient to persuade you to
join, I will be happy to try my hand at revising the draft.
Since r e l ~

Justice Powell

.:§u:p-rmu C!fcurt o-f tqt ~ttiltb j;htlte

~a:.a-J:rn:gton. ~. <!J. 2!lffe~,
CHAMB E RS 01'

March 26, 1984

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

~
Re: No. 82-1248 - Schall v. Martin
No. 82-1278 - Abrams v. Martin
Dear Bill:
I have spent a good bit of time on this case, for I think
its posture is important.
I agree with your result on the merits, but I am troubled about the _opinion's unwillingness to
recognize the relevance of the class-wide statistics to a facial
attack on the statute.
In other words, I generally share Lewis' concerns when he
says that the opinion does not address the respondents' principal argument and the grounds on which the courts below decided
the case.
I also agree that we should seriously consider meeting the statistics head~on and, even in the face of them, rule
that the statute is valid.
I hope that you will consider Lewis' suggestions.
I think
it would be helpful indeed if we could develop an opinion in
which most of us could join and thereby avoid a fractionated
vote.
Sincerely,

1~

Ju s tice Rehnquist
cc: The Chief Justice
Justice Powell
Justice O'Connor
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The Chief Justice ..jJ
Justice Brennan ~
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Rehnquist

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

,/iAR 2 7 1984

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 320.5(3)(b) of the New York Family Court Act au
thorizes pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquen
based on a finding that there is a "serious risk" that the child
"may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime." 1 Appellees
1
Section 320.5 of the Family Court Act (FCA) provides, in relevant
part:
"l. At the initial appearance, the court in its discretion may release the
respondent or direct his detention.

3. The court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts
and reasons for so finding that unless the respondent is detained;
(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on
the return date; or
(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date commit an
act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime."

F
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....,
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brought suit on behalf of a class of all juveniles detained pursuant to that provision. 2 The district court struck down
§ 320.5(3)(b) as permitting detention without due process of
law and ordered the immediate release of all class members.
513 F. Supp. 691 (1981). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, h~lding the provision "unconstitutional
as to all juveniles" because the statute is administered in such
a way that "the detention period serves as punishment imposed without proof of guilt established according to the requisite constitutional standard." 689 F. 2d 365, 373-374
(1982). We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - (1983), 3 and now reverse. We conclude that preventive deAppellees have only challenged pretrial detention under § 320.5(3)(b).
Thus, the propriety of detention to ensure that a juvenile appears in court
on the return date, pursuant to § 320.5(3)(a), is not before the Court.
2
The original challenge was to § 739(a)(ii) of the FCA, which, at the time
of the commencement of this suit, governed pretrial release or detention of
both alleged juvenile delinquents and persons in need of supervision. Effective July 1, 1983, a new Article 3 to the Act governs, inter alia, "all juvenile delinquency actions and proceedings commenced upon or after the
effective date thereof and all appeals and other post-judgment proceedings
relating or attaching thereto." FCA § 301.3(1). Article 7 now applies
only to proceedings concerning persons in need of supervision.
Obviously, this Court must "review the judgment below in light of the
... statute as it now stands, not as it once did." Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S.
45, 48 (1969). But since new Article 3 contains a preventive detention section identical to former § 739(a)(ii), see FCA § 320.5(3), the appeal is not
moot. Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41, 43 (1969).
3
Although the pretrial detention of the class representatives has long
since ended, see pp. 3-7, infra, this case is not moot for the same reason
that the class action in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110 n. 11 (1975),
was not mooted by the termination of the claims of the named plaintiffs.
"Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any
given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The individual could nonetheless
suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly
situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures.
The claim, in short, is one that is distinctly 'capable of repetition, yet evading review."'
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tention under the Family Court Act serves a legitimate state
objective, and that the procedural protections afforded pretrial detainees by the New York statute satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I
Appellee Gregory Martin was arrested on December 13,
1977, and charged with first-degree robbery, second-degree
assault, and criminal possession of a weapon based on an incident in which he, with two others, allegedly hit a youth on
the head with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and sneakers.
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Martin had possession of the gun
when he was arrested. He was 14 years old at the time and,
therefore, came within the jurisdiction of New York's Family
Gourt. 4 The incident occurred at 11:30 at night, and Martin
lied to the police about where and with whom he lived. He
was consequently detained overnight. 6
See also People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 519-520
(1976).
' In New York, a child over the age of seven but less than sixteen is not
considered criminally responsible for his conduct. FCA § 301.2(1). If he
commits an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, he
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court. Id., at
§ 302.1(1). That court is charged not with finding guilt and affixing punishment, In re Bogart, 259 N. Y. S. 2d 351 (1963), but rather with determining and pursuing the needs and best interests of the child insofar as
those are consistent with the need for the protection of the community.
FCA §301.1. See In re Craig S., 394 N. Y. S. 2d 200 (1977). Juvenile
proceedings are, thus, civil rather than criminal, although because of the
restrictions that may be placed on a juvenile adjudged delinquent, some of
the same protections afforded accused adult criminals are also applicable in
this context. Cf. FCA § 303.1.
5
When a juvenile is arrested, the arresting officer must immediately
notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the child's care.
FCA § 305.2(3). Ordinarily, the child will be released into the custody of
his parent or guardian after being issued an "appearance ticket" requiring
him to meet with the probation service on a specified day. Id., at
§307.1(1). Seen. 9, supra. If, however, he is charged with a serious
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A petition of delinquency was filed, 6 and Martin made his
"initial appearance" in Family Court on December 14th, accompanied by his grandmother. 7 The Family Court judge,
citing the possession of the loaded weapon, the false address
given to the police, and the lateness of the hour, as evidencing a lack of supervision, ordered Martin detained under
§ 320.5(3)(b) (at that time § 739(a)(ii); see n. 2, supra). A
probable cause hearing was held five days later, ·on December 19th, and probable cause was found to exist for all the
crime, one of several designated felonies, see id., at § 301.2(8), or if his parent or guardian cannot be reached, the juvenile may be taken directly before the Family Court. Id., at § 305.2. The Family Court judge will
make a preliminary determination as to the jurisdiction of the court, appoint a law guardian for the child, and advise the child of his or her rights,
including the right to counsel and the right to remain silent.
Only if, as in Martin's case, the Family Court is not in session and special
circumstances exist, such as an inability to notify the parents, will the child
be taken directly by the arresting officer to a juvenile detention facility.
Id., at § 305.2(4)(c). If the juvenile is so detained, he must be brought before the Family Court within 72 hours or the next day the court is in session, whichever is sooner. Id., at§ 307.3(4). The propriety of such detention, prior to a juvenile's initial appearance in Family Court, is not at
issue in this case. Appellees challenged only judicially ordered detention
pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b).
6
A delinquency petition, prepared by the "presentment agency," originates delinquency proceedings. FCA § 310.1. The petition must contain,
inter alia, a precise statement of each crime charged and factual allegations which "clearly apprise" the juvenile of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation. Id., at § 311.1. A petition is not deemed sufficient
unless the allegations of the factual part of the petition, together with those
of any supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide reasonable
cause to believe that the juvenile committed the crime or crimes charged.
Id., at § 311.2(2). Also, nonhearsay allegations in the petition and supporting deposition must establish, if true, every element of each crime
charged and the juvenile's commission thereof. Id., at § 311.2(3). The
sufficiency of a petition may be tested by filing a motion to dismiss under
§ 315.1.
7
The first proceeding in Family Court following the filing of the petition
is known as the initial appearance even if the juvenile has already been
brought before the court immediately following his arrest. FCA § 320.2.
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crimes charged. At the fact-finding hearing held December
27-29, Martin was found guilty on the robbery and criminal
possession charges. He was adjudicated a delinquent and
placed on two years' probation. 8 He had been detained pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b), between the initial appearance and the
completion of the fact-finding hearing, for a total of fifteen
days.
Appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan, both age 14,
were also ordered detained pending their fact-finding hearings. Rosario was charged with attempted first-degree robbery and second-degree assault for an incident in which he,
with four others, allegedly tried to rob two men, putting a
gun to the head of one of them and beating both about the
8
The "fact finding" is the juvenile's analogue of a trial. As in the earlier
proceedings, the juvenile has a right to counsel at this hearing. Id., at
§ 341.2. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). Evidence may be suppressed on the same grounds as in criminal cases, FCA § 330.2, and proof
of guilt, based on the record evidence, must be beyond a reasonable doubt,
id., at§ 342.2. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). If guilt is established, the court enters an appropriate order and schedules a dispositional
hearing. Id., at § 345.1.
The dispositional hearing is the final and most important proceeding in
the Family Court. If the juvenile has committed a designated felony, the
court must order a probation investigation and a diagnostic assessment.
Id. , at § 351.1. Any other material and relevant evidence may be offered
by the probation agency or the juvenile. Both sides may call and crossexamine witnesses and recommend specific dispositional alternatives.
Id., at § 350.4. The court must find, based on a preponderance of the evidence, id., at § 350.3(2), that the juvenile is delinquent and requires supervision, treatment or confinement. Id., at § 352.1. Otherwise, the petition is dismissed. Ibid.
If the juvenile is found to be delinquent, then the court enters an order of
disposition. Possible alternatives include a conditional discharge; probation for up to two years; nonsecure placement with, perhaps, a relative or
the division for youth; transfer to the commissioner of mental health; or
secure placement. Id., at§ 353.1-§ 353.5. Unless the juvenile committed
one of the designated felonies, the court must order the least restrictive
available alternative consistent with the needs and best interests of the juvenile and the need for protection of the community. Id., at § 352.2(2).
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head with sticks. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. At the time of
his initial appearance, on March 15, 1979, Rosario had another delinquency petition pending for knifing a student, and
two prior petitions had been adjusted. 9 Probable cause was
found on March 21. On April 11, Rosario was released to his
father, and the case was terminated without adjustment on
September 25, 1979.
·
Kenneth Morgan was charged with attempted robbery and
attempted grand larceny for an incident in which he and another boy allegedly tried to steal money from a 14-year-old
girl and her brother by threatening to blow theirs heads off
and grabbing them to search their pockets. See Plaintiff's
Exhibit 3. Morgan, like Rosario, was on release status on
another petition (for robbery and criminal possession of
stolen property) at the time of his initial appearance on
March 27, 1978. He had been arrested four previous times,
and his mother refused to come to court because he had been
in trouble so often she did not want him home. A probable
cause hearing was set for March 30, but was continued until
April 4, when it was combined with a fact-finding hearing.
9
Every accused juvenile is interviewed by a member of the staff of the
probation department. This process is known as "probation intake." See
Testimony of Mr. Benjamin (Supervisor, New York Dept. of Probation),
J. A., at 142. In the course of the interview, which lasts an average of 45
minutes, the probation officer will gather what information he can about
the nature of the case, the attitudes of the parties involved, and the child's
past history and current family circumstances. Id., at 144, 153. His
sources of information are the child, his parent or guardian, the arresting
officer and any records of past contacts between the child and the Family
Court. On the basis of this interview, the probation officer may attempt
to "adjust," or informally resolve, the case. FCA § 308.1(2). Adjustment
is a purely voluntary process in which the complaining witness agrees not
to press the case further, while the juvenile is given a warning or agrees to
counseling sessions or, perhaps, referral to a community agency. Id., at
§ 308.1 (Practice Commentary). In cases involving designated felonies or
other serious crimes, adjustment is not permitted without written approval
of the Family Court. Id., at § 308.1(4). If a case is not informally adjusted, it is referred to the "presentment agency." Seen. 6, infra.
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Morgan was found guilty of harassment and petit larceny and
was ordered placed with the Department of Social Services
for 18 months. He was detained a total of eight days between his initial appearance and the fact-finding hearing.
On December 21, 1977, while still in preventive detention
pending his fact-finding hearing, Gregory Martin instituted a
habeas corpus class action on behalf of "those persons who
are, or during the pendency of this action, will be preventively detained pursuant to" § 320.5(3)(b) of the Family Court
Act. Rosario and Morgan were subsequently added as additional named plaintiffs. These three class representatives
sought a declaratory judgment that § 320.5(3)(b) violates the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In an unpublished opinion, the district court certified the
class. J. A., at 20-32. 10 The court also held that appellees
were not required to exhaust their state remedies before resorting to federal habeas because the highest state court had
already rejected an identical challenge to the juvenile preventive detention statute. See People ex rel. Wayburn v.
Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (1976). Exhaustion of state
remedies, therefore, would be "an exercise in futility."
J. A., at 26.
At trial, appellees offered in evidence the case histories of
thirty-four members of the class, including the three named
petitioners. Both parties presented some general statistics
on the relation between pretrial detention and ultimate disposition. In addition, there was testimony concerning juvenile
proceedings from a number of witnesses, including a legal aid
attorney specializing in juvenile cases, a probation supervi10

We have never decided whether Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 23, providing for
class actions, is applicable to petitions for habeas corpus relief. See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 527 n. 6 (1979); Middendorfv . Henry, 425 U. S. 25,
30 (1976). Although appellants contested the class certification in the district court, they did not raise the issue on appeal; nor do they urge it here.
Again, therefore, we have no occasion to reach the question.
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sor, a child psychologist, and a Family Court judge. On the
basis of this evidence, the district court rejected the equal
protection challenge as "insubstantial," 11 but agreed with appellees that pretrial detention under the Family Court Act
violates due process. 12 The court ordered that "all class
members in custody pursuant to Family Court Act Section
[320.5(3)(b)] shall be released forthwith." J. A., at 93.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. After reviewing the trial
record, the court opined that "the vast majority of juveniles
detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] either have their petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released
after adjudication." 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court concluded
from that fact that § 320.5(3)(b) "is utilized principally, not for
preventive purposes, but to impose punishment for
unadjudicated criminal acts." Id., at 372. The early release
of so many of those detained contradicts any asserted need
11
The equal protection claim, which was neither raised on appeal nor decided by the Second Circuit, is not before us.
12
The district court gave three reasons for this conclusion. First, under
the FCA, a juvenile may be held in pretrial detention for up to five days
without any judicial determination of probable cause. Relying on Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975), the district court concluded that pretrial detention without a prior adjudication of probable cause is, itself, a per
se violation of due process. 513 F. Supp., at 717.
Second, after a review of the pertinent scholarly literature, the court
noted that "no diagnostic tools have as yet been devised which enable even
the most highly trained criminologists to predict reliably which juveniles
will engage in violent crime." 513 F. Supp., at 708. Afortiori, the court
concluded, a Family Court judge cannot make a reliable prediction based
on the limited information available to him at the initial appearance. Id.,
at 712. Moreover, the court felt that the trial record was "replete" with
examples of arbitrary and capricious detentions. Id., at 713.
Finally, the court concluded that preventive detention is merely a euphemism for punishment imposed without an adjudication of guilt. The alleged purpose of the detention-to protect society from the juvenile's criminal conduct-is indistinguishable from the purpose of post-trial detention.
And given "the inability of trial judges to predict which juveniles will commit crimes," there is no rational connection between the decision to detain
and the alleged purpose, even if that purpose were legitimate. Id., at 716.
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for pretrial confinement to protect the community. The
court therefore concluded that § 320.5(3)(b) must be declared
unconstitutional as to all juveniles. Individual litigation
would be a practical impossibility because the periods of detention are so short that the litigation is mooted before the
merits are determined. 13

II
There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable
in juvenile proceedings. "The problem," we have stressed,
"is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings." In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1,
13-14 (1967). We have held that certain basic constitutional
protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to
juveniles. See In re Gault, supra, at 31-57 (notice of
charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination,
right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship,
397 U. S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed
v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy). But the
Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences
in the treatment of juveniles. See, e. g., M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial). The
State has "a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child," Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U. S. 745, 766 (1982), which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial. We have
tried, therefore, to strike a balance-to respect the "informality" and "flexibility" that characterize juvenile proceedings, In re Winship, supra, at 366, and yet to ensure that
such proceedings comport with the "fundamental fairness"
demanded by the Due Process Clause. Breed v. Jones,
supra, at 531; McKeiver, supra, at 543 (plurality opinion).
Judge Newman concurred separately. He was not convinced that the
record supported the majority's statistical conclusions. But he thought
that the statute was procedurally infirm because it granted unbridled discretion to Family Court judges to make an inherently uncertain prediction
of future criminal behavior. 689 F. 2d, at 377.
18
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The statutory provision at issue in this case, § 320.5(3)(b),
permits a brief pretrial detention based on a finding of a "serious risk" that an arrested juvenile may commit a crime before his return date. The question before us is whether preventive detention of juveniles pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) is
compatible with the "fundamental fairness" required by due
process. Two separate inquiries are necessary to answer
this question. First, does preventive detention under the
New York statute serve a legitimate state objective? See
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 534 n. 15 (1979); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S .. 144, 168--169 (1963). And,
second, are the procedural safeguards contained in the Family Court Act adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of
at least some juveniles charged with crimes? See Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
u. s. 103, 114 (1975).
A

Preventive detention under the Family Court Act is purportedly designed to protect the child and society from the
potential consequences of his criminal acts. People ex rel.
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 521-522 (1976).
When making any detention decision, the Family Court judge
is specifically directed to consider the needs and best interests of the juvenile as well as the need for the protection of
the community. FCA §301.1; In re Craig S., 394 N. Y. S.
2d 200 (1977). In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 534 n. 15, we
left open the question whether any governmental objective
other than ensuring a detainee's presence at trial may constitutionally justify pretrial detention. As an initial matter,
therefore, we must decide whether, in the context of the juvenile system, the combined interest in protecting both the
community and the juvenile himself from the consequences of
future criminal conduct is sufficient to justify such detention.
The "legitimate and compelling state interest" in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted. DeVeau
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v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). See also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968). We have stressed before that
crime prevention is "a weighty social objective," Broum v.
Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979), and this interest persists undiluted in the juvenile context. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1,
20 n. 26 (1967). The harm suffered by the victim of a crime
is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator. 14 And the
harm to society generally may even be greater in this context
given the high rate of recidivisim among juveniles. In re
Gault, 387 U. S., at 22.
The juvenile's countervailing interest in freedom from institutional restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is
undoubtedly substantial as well. See In re Gault, 387 U. S.,
at 27. But that interest must be qualified by the recognition
that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services,
458 U. S. 502, 510-511 (1982); In re Gault, supra, at 17.
Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity
to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject
to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters,
the State must play its part as parens patriae. See State v.
Gleason, 404 A. 2d 573, 580 (Me. 1979); People ex rel.
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 522 (1976); Baker
v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d 149, 150-151 (Ky. App. 1971). In
this respect, the juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's "parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 766 (1982).
In 1982, juveniles under,16 accounted for 7.5 percent of all arrests for
violent crimes, 19.9 percent of all arrests for serious property crime, and
17.3 percent of all arrests for violent and serious property crimes combined. 1982 Crime in the United States 176-177 (United States Dept. of
Justice) ("violent crimes" include murder, non-negligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault; "serious property crimes"
include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson).
14
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The New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the statute
at issue here, stressed at some length "the desirability of protecting the juvenile from his own folly." People ex rel.
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976). 15
Society has a legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from
the consequences of his criminal activity-both from potential physical injury which may be suffered when a victim
fights back or a policeman attempts to make an arrest and
from the downward spiral of criminal activity into which peer
pressure may lead the child. See L. 0. W. v. District Court
of Arapahoe, 623 P. 2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Colo. 1981); Morris
v. D'Amario, 416 A. 2d 137, 140 (R. I. 1980). See also
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115 (1982) (minority "is
a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage"); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979) (juveniles "often lack the
16
"Our society recognizes that juveniles in general are in the earlier
stages of their emotional growth, that their intellectual development is
incomplete, that they have had only limited practical experience, and that
their value systems have not yet been clearly identified or firmly
adopted ....
"For the same reasons that our society does not hold juveniles to an
adult standard of responsibility for their conduct, our society may also conclude that there is a greater likelihood that a juvenile charged with delinquency, if released, will commit another criminal act than that an adult
charged with crime will do so. To the extent that self-restraint may be
expected to constrain adults, it may not be expected to operate with equal
force as to juveniles. Because of the possibility of juvenile delinquency
treatment and the absence of second-offender sentencing, there will not be
the deterrent for the juvenile which confronts the adult. Perhaps more
significant is the fact that in consequence of lack of experience and comprehension the juvenile does not view the commission of what are criminal acts
in the same perspective as an adult .... There is the element of gamesmanship and the excitement of 'getting away' with something and the powerful inducement of peer pressures. All of these commonly acknowledged
factors make the commission of criminal conduct on the part of juveniles in
general more likely than in the case of adults." People ex rel. Wayburn v.
Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976).
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experience, perspective and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them").
The substantiality and legitimacy of the state interests underlying this statute are confirmed by the wide-spread use
and judicial acceptance of preventive detention for juveniles.
Every State, as well as the United States in the District of
Columbia, permits preventive detention of juveniles accused
of crime. 16 A number of model juvenile justice acts also contain provisions permitting preventive detention. 17 And the
16
Ala. Code § 12-15--59 (1975); Alas. Stat. § 47.10.140 (1979); 17A Ariz.
Rev. Stats. Juv. Ct. Rules of Proc., rule 3 (1983-84 Supp.); Ark. Stat.
Ann, § 45-421 (1983 Supp.); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 628 (1984 Supp.);
Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-102 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Conn. Gen. Stats.
§ 46b-131 (1983-84 Supp.); Dela. Fam. Ct. Rule 60 (1981); D. C. Code
§ 16-2310 (1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.032 (1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-19
(1982); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 571-31.1 (1982 Supp.); Idaho Code § 16-1811
(1983 Supp.); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 703--4 (1983-84 Supp.); Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 31-6--4--5 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.22 (1983-84
Supp.); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1632 (1982 Cum. Supp.); Ky. Rev. Stats.
§ 208.192 (1982); La. Code Juv. Proc. Art. 40 (1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, § 3203 (1983-84 Supp.); Md. Ann. Code § ~15 (1983 Cum. Supp.);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 66 (1983 Supp.); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§712A.15 (1983-84 Supp.); Minn. Stat. Ann. §260.171 (1982); Miss. Code
Ann. § 43-23-11 (1981); Mo. R. Juv. Ct. 111.02 (1981); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 41-5--305 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-255 (1982 Cum. Supp.); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 62.140 (1983); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169B:14 (1983 Cum. Supp.);
N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-56 (1983-84 Supp.); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-24
(1981 Supp.); N. Y. FCA § 320.5(3) (1983); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-574
(1981); N. D. Cent. Code §27-20-14 (1974); Ohio Rev. Code Ann., tit. 21,
ch. 2151.311 (1978); Okla. Stat. Ann. ch. 10, § 1107 (198~4 Supp.); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 419.573 (1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6325 (1982); R. I. Gen. Laws
§§ 14-1-20, 21 (1981); S. C. Code Ann. § 20-7-600 (1983 Cum. Supp.); S. D.
Code § 26-8-19.2 (1983 Supp.); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-214 (1983 Supp.);
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.02 (1982-83 Supp.); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-30
(1983 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §643 (1981); Va. Code Ann.§ 16.1-248
(1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.040 (1983-84 Cum. Supp.); W. Va.
Code Ann. § 49-5-8 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 48.208 (1983-84
Supp.); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-206 (1977).
17
See United States Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Standards for the Administration of Juvenile

82-1248 & 82-127~0PINION
14

SCHALL v. MARTIN

courts of eight States, including the New York Court of Appeals, have upheld their statutes with specific reference to
protecting the juvenile and the community from harmful pretrial conduct, including pretrial crime. L.0. W. v. District
Court of Arapahoe, 623 P. 2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Colo. 1981);
Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A. 2d 137, 139-140 (R. I. 1980);
State v. Gleason, 404 A. 2d 573, 583 (Me. 1979); Pauley v.
Gross, 574 P. 2d 234, 237-238 (Kan. App. 1977); People ex
rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976);
Aubrey v. Gadbois, 123 Cal. Reptr. 365, 366 (CA App. 1975);
Baker v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d 149, 150-151 (Ky. App. 1971);
Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal v. Hendrick, 265 A. 2d 348,
349-350 (Pa. 1970).
"The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of
states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934)." Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 798 (1952). In light of the uniform legislative
judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles properly promotes the interests both of society and the juvenile, we conJustice, Report of the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention (U. S. Gov. Printing Office, July 1980), at
294-296; Uniform Juvenile Court Act, § 14, 9A U. L. A. (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-1968); Standard Juvenile
Court Act, Art. IV, § 16, proposed by the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency (6th Ed. 1959); W. Sheridan, Legislative Guide for Drafting
Family and Juvenile Court Acts,§ 20(a)(l) (Dept. of HEW, Children's Bureau, Pub. No. 472-1969); see also Standards for Juvenile and Family
Courts, at 62-63 (Dept. of HEW, Children's Bureau, Pub. No. 437-1966).
Cf. Institute of Judicial Administration/American Bar Association Juvenile
Justice Standards Relating to Interim Status: The Release, Control, and
Detention of Accused Juvenile Offenders Between Arrest and Disposition
3.2B (detention limited to "reducing the likelihood that the juvenile may
inflict serious bodily harm on others during the interim").
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elude that the practice serves a legitimate regulatory purpose
compatible with the "fundamental fairness" demanded by the
Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings. Cf. M cKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 548 (1971) (plurality
opinion). 18
Of course, the mere invocation of a legitimate purpose will
not justify particular restrictions and conditions of confinement amounting to punishment. It is axiomatic that "[d]ue
process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished."
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 535 n. 16. Even given, therefore, that pretrial detention may serve legitimate regulatory
purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether the terms
and conditions of confinement under § 320.5(3)(b) are in fact
compatible with those purposes. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). "A court must decide
whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose." Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538.
Absent a showing of an express intent to punish on the part
of the State, that determination generally will turn on
"whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction]
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as18
Appellees argue that some limit must be placed on the categories of
crimes that detained juveniles must be accused of having committed or
being likely to commit. But the discretion to delimit the categories of
crimes justifying detention, like the discretion to define criminal offenses
and prescribe punishments, resides wholly with the state legislatures.
Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 689 (1980); Rochin v. California,
342 U. S. 165, 168 (1952). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275
(1980) ("the presence or absence of violence does not always affect the
strength of society's interest in deterring a particular crime").
More fundamentally, this sort of attack on a criminal statute must be
made on a case-by-case basis. United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 21
(1960). The court will not sift through the entire class to determine
whether the statute was constitutionally applied in each case. And, outside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be
attacked as overbroad. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982).
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signed [to it.]" Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, at
168-189. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538; Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 613-614 (1960).
There is no indication in the statute itself that preventive
detention is used or intended as a punishment. First of all,
the detention is strictly limited in time. If a juvenile is detained at his initial appearance and has denied the charges
against him, he is entitled to a probable cause hearing to be
held not more than three days after the conclusion of the initial appearance or four days after the filing of the petition,
whichever is sooner. FCA § 325.1(2). 19 If the Family Court
judge finds probable cause, he must also determine whether
continued detention is necessary pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b).
Id., at §325.3(3).
Detained juveniles are also entitled to an expedited factfinding hearing. If the juvenile is charged with one of a limited number of designated felonies, the fact-finding hearing
must be scheduled to commence not more than fourteen days
after the conclusion of the initial appearance. Id., at § 340.1.
If the juvenile is charged with a lesser offense, then the factfinding hearing must be held not more than three days after
the initial appearance. 20 In the latter case, since the time for
the probable cause hearing and the fact-finding hearing coincide, the two hearings are merged.
Thus, the maximum possible detention under § 320.5(3)(b)
of a youth accused of a serious crime, assuming a three-day
extension of the fact-finding hearing for good cause shown, is
seventeen days. The maximum detention for less serious
crimes, again assuming a three-day extension for good cause
shown, is six days. These time-frames seem suited to the
limited purpose of providing the youth with a controlled envi19
For good cause shown, the court may adjourn the hearing, but for no
more than three additional court days. FCA § 325.1(3).
20
In either case, the court may adjourn the hearing for not more than
three days for good cause shown. FCA § 340.1(3). The court must state
on the record the reason for any adjournment. Id., at §340.1(4).
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ronment and separating him from improper influences pending the speedy disposition of his case.
The conditions of confinement also appear to reflect the
regulatory purposes relied upon by the State. When a juvenile is remanded after his initial appearance, he cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, be sent to a prison or lockup
where he would be exposed to adult criminals. FCA
§ 304.1(2). Instead, the child is screened by an "assessment
unit" of the Department of Juvenile Justice. Testimony of
Mr. Kelly (Deputy Commissioner of Operations, New York
City Department of Juvenile Justice), J. A., at 286-287.
The assessment unit places the child in either nonsecure or
secure detention. Nonsecure detention involves an open
facility in the community, a sort of "halfway house," without
locks, bars or security officers where the child receives
schooling and counseling and has access to recreational facilities. Id., at 285; Testimony of Mr. Benjamin, J. A., at
149-150.
Secure detention is more restrictive, but it is still consistent with the regulatory and parens patriae objectives relied
upon by the State. Children are assigned to separate dorms
based on age, size and behavior. They wear street clothes
provided by the institution and partake in educational and
recreational programs and counseling sessions run by trained
social workers. Misbehavior is punished by confinement to
one's room. See Testimony of Mr. Kelly, J. A., at 292-297.
We cannot conclude from this record that the controlled environment briefly imposed by the State on juveniles in secure
pretrial detention "is imposed for the purpose of punishment"
rather than as "an incident of some other legitimate government purpose." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 538.
The Court of Appeals, of course, did conclude that the underlying purpose of§ 320.5(3)(b) is punitive rather than regulatory. But the court did not dispute that preventive detention might serve legitimate regulatory purposes or that the
terms and conditions of pretrial confinement in New York are
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compatible with those purposes. Rather, the court invalidated a significant aspect of New York's juvenile justice system based solely on some case histories and a statistical study
which appeared to show that "the vast majority of juveniles
detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] either have their petitions dismissed before an adjudication or are released after adjudication." 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court assumed that dismissal
of a petition or failure to confine a juvenile at the dispositional
hearing belied the need to detain him prior to fact finding and
that, therefore, the pretrial detention constituted punishment. Id., at 373. Since punishment imposed without a
prior adjudication of guilt is per se illegitimate, the Court of
Appeals concluded that no juveniles could be held pursuant to
§ 320.5(3)(b).
There are some obvious flaws in the statistics and case histories relied upon by the lower court. 21 But even assuming it
to be the case that "by far the greater number of juveniles
incarcerated under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] will never be confined as a
21
For example, as the Court of Appeals itself admits, 689 F. 2d, at 369 n.
18, the statistical study on which it relied mingles indiscriminately detentions under § 320.5(3)(b) with detentions under § 320.5(3)(a). The latter
provision applies only to juveniles who are likely not to appear on the return date if not detained, and appellees concede that such juveniles may be
lawfully detained. Brief for Appellees, at 93. Furthermore, the thirtyfour case histories on which the court relied were handpicked by appellees'
counsel from over a three-year period. Compare Plaintiff's Exhibit 19a
(detention of Geraldo Delgado on March 5, 1976) with Plaintiff's Exhibit
35a (detention of James Ancrum on August 19, 1979). The Court of Appeals stated that appellants did not contest the representativeness of these
case histories. 689 F. 2d, at 369 n. 19. Appellants argue, however, that
there was no occasion to contest their representativeness because the case
histories were not even offered by appellees as a representative sample,
and were not evaluated by appellees' expert statistician or the district
court in that light. See Brief for Intervenor-Appellant, at 24-25 n. *. We
need not resolve this controversy. But it is worth noting that, even if randomly selected, the thirty-four case histories may be too few in number to
constitute a valid statistical sample. See Mayor v. Educational Equality
League, 415 U. S. 605, 620--621 (1974).
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consequence of a disposition imposed after an adjudication of
delinquency," 689 F. 2d, at 371-372, we find that to be an insufficient ground for upsetting the widely-shared legislative
judgment that preventive detention serves an important and
legitimate function in the juvenile justice system. We are
unpersuaded by the Court of Appeals' rather cavalier equation of detentions that do not lead to continued confinement
after an adjudication of guilt and "wrongful" or "punitive"
pretrial detentions.
Pretrial detention need not be considered punitive merely
because a juvenile is subsequently discharged subject to conditions or put on probation. In fact, such actions reinforce
the original finding that close supervision of the juvenile is
required. Lenient but supervised disposition is in keeping
with the Act's purpose to promote the welfare and development of the child. 22 As the New York Court of Appeals
noted:
"It should surprise no one that caution and concern for
both the juvenile and society may indicate the more conservative decision to detain at the very outset, whereas
the later development of very much more relevant information may prove that while a finding of delinquency
was warranted, placement may not be indicated." People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y.S. 2d 518, 522
(1976).
Even when a case is terminated prior to fact finding, it
does not follow that the decision to detain the juvenile pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) amounted to a due process violation. A
delinquency petition may be dismissed for any number of reasons collateral to its merits, such as the failure of a witness to
testify. The Family Court judge cannot be expected to
22

Judge Quinones testified that detention at disposition is considered a
"harsh solution." At the dispositional hearing, the Family Court judge
usually has "a much more complete picture of the youngster" and tries to
tailor the least restrictive dispositional order compatible with that picture.
Testimony of Judge Quinones, J. A., at 27~281.

l
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anticipate such developments at the initial hearing. He
makes his decision based on the information available to him
at that time, and the propriety of the decision must be judged
in that light. Consequently, the final disposition of a case is
"largely irrelevant" to the legality of a pretrial detention.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 145 (1979).
It may be, of course, that in some circumstances detention
of a juvenile would not pass constitutional muster. But the
validity of those detentions must be determined on a case-bycase basis. Section 320.5(3)(b) is not invalid "on its face" by
reason of the ambiguous statistics and case histories relied
upon by the court below. 23 We find no justification for the
conclusion that, contrary to the express language of the statute and the judgment of the highest state court, § 320.5(3)(b)
is a punitive rather than a regulatory measure. Preventive
detention under the Family Court Act serves the legitimate
state objective, held in common with every State in the country, of protecting both the juvenile and society from the hazards of pretrial crime.

B
Given the legitimacy of the State's interest in preventive
detention, and the nonpunitive nature of that detention, the
23
Several amici argue that similar statistics obtain throughout the country. See, e. g., Brief of the American Bar Association, at 23; Brief of the
Association for Children of New Jersey, at 8, 11; Brief of the Youth Law
Center and the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, at 13-14. But even if
New York's experienc_e were duplicated on a national scale, that fact would
not lead us, as amici urge, to conclude that every State and the United
States is illicitly punishing juveniles prior to their trial. On the contrary,
if such statistics obtain nationwide, our conclusion is strengthened that the
existence of the statistics in this case is not a sufficient ground for striking
down New York's statute. As already noted: "The fact that a practice is
followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to
whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked as

_,
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remaining question is whether the procedures afforded juveniles detained prior to fact finding provide sufficient protection against erroneous and unnecessary deprivations of liberty. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). 24
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975), we held that a
judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to
any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of
crime. We did not, however, mandate a specific time-table.
Nor did we require the "full panoply of adversary safeguards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process of witnesses." Id., at 119. Instead, we recognized "the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by
the States." Id., at 123. Gerstein arose under the Fourth
Amendment, but the same concern with "flexibility" and "informality," while yet ensuring adequate predetention procedures, is present in this context. In re Winship, 397 U. S.
358, 366 (1970); Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 554
(1966).
In many respects, the Family Court Act provides far more
predetention protection for juveniles than we found to be
constitutionally required for adults in Gerstein. The initial
appearance is informal, but the accused juvenile is given full
notice of the charges against him and a complete stenographic record is kept of the hearing. See 513 F. Supp., at
702. The juvenile appears accompanied by his parent or
guardian. 25 He is first informed of his rights, including the
fundamental. ' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934)." Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 798 (1952).
24
Appellees urge the alleged lack of procedural safeguards as an alternative ground for upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Brief for
Appellees, at 62-75. The court itself intimated that it would reach the
same result on that ground , 689 F. 2d, at 373-374, and Judge Newman, in
his concurrence, relied expressly on perceived procedural flaws in the statute. Accordingly, we deem it necessary to consider the question.
25
If the juvenile's parent or guardian fails to appear after reasonable and
substantial efforts have been made to notify such person, the court must
appoint a law guardian for the child. FCA § 320.3.
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right to remain silent and the right to be represented by
counsel chosen by him or by a law guardian assigned by the
court. FCA § 320.3. The initial appearance may be adjourned for no longer than 72 hours or until the next court
day, whichever is sooner, to enable an appointed law guardian or other counsel to appear before the court. Id., at
§ 320.2(3). When his counsel is present, the juvenile is informed of the charges against him and furnished with a copy
of the delinquency petition. Id., at § 320.4(1). A representative from the presentment agency appears in support of the
petition.
The nonhearsay allegations in the delinquency petition and
supporting depositions must establish probable cause to believe the juvenile committed the offense. Although the
Family Court judge is not required to make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance, the youth may challenge
the sufficiency of the petition on that ground. FCA § 315.1.
Thus, the juvenile may oppose any recommended detention
by arguing that there is not probable cause to believe he committed the offense or offenses with which he is charged. If
the petition is not dismissed, the juvenile is given an opportunity to admit or deny the charges. Id., at § 321.1. 26
At the conclusion of the initial appearance, the presentment agency makes a recommendation regarding detention.
A probation officer reports on the juvenile's record, including
other prior and current Family Court and probation contacts,
26
If the child chooses to remain silent, he is assumed to deny the charges.
FCA § 321. 1. With the consent of the court and of the presentment
agency, the child may admit to a lesser charge. If he wishes to admit to
the charges or to a lesser charge, the court must, before accepting the admission, advise the child of his right to a fact-finding hearing and of the
possible specific dispositional orders that may result from the admission.
Ibid. The court must also satisfy itself that the child actually did commit
the acts to which he admits. Ibid.
With the consent of the victim or complainant and the juvenile, the court
may also refer a case to the probation service for adjustment. If the case
is subsequently adjusted , the petition is then dismissed. Id., at §320.6.
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as well as relevant information concerning home life, school
attendance, and any special medical or developmental problems. He concludes by offering his agency's recommendation on detention. Opposing counsel, the juvenile's parents,
and the juvenile himself may all speak on his behalf and challenge any information or recommendation. If the judge does
decide to detain the juvenile under § 320.5(3)(b), he must
state on the record the facts and reasons for the detention. 27
As noted, a detained juvenile is entitled to a formal, adversarial probable cause hearing within three days of his initial
appearance, with one three-day extension possible for good
cause shown. 28 The burden at this hearing is on the presentment agency to call witnesses and offer evidence in support of
the charges. Id., at § 325.2. Testimony is under oath and
subject to cross-examination. Ibid. The accused juvenile
may call witnesses and offer evidence in his own behalf. If
the court finds probable cause, the court must again decide
whether continued detention is necessary under§ 320.5(3)(b).
Again, the facts and reasons for the detention must be stated
on the record.
In sum, notice, a hearing, and a statement of facts and reasons are given prior to any detention under§ 320.5(3)(b). A
formal probable cause hearing is then held within a short
while thereafter, if the fact-finding hearing is not itself scheduled within three days. These flexible procedures are con27

Given that under Gerstein , 420 U. S., at 119--123, a probable cause
hearing may be informal and nonadversarial, a Family Court judge could
make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance. That he is not
required to do so does not, under the circumstances, amount to a deprivation of due process. Appellees fail to point to a single example where
probable cause was not found after a decision was made to detain the child.
28
The Court in Gerstein indicated approval of pretrial detention procedures that supplied a probable cause hearing within five days of the initial
detention. 420 U. S. , at 124 n. 25. The brief delay in the probable cause
hearing may actually work to the advantage of the juvenile since it gives
his counsel, usually appointed at the initial appearance pursuant to FCA
§ 320.2(2), time to prepare.
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stitutionally adequate, whether the inquiry be phrased as one
under the Fourth Amendment, see Gerstein v. Pugh, or
under the Due Process Clause, see Kent v. United States, 383
U. S. 541, 557 (1966). Appellees have failed to note any additional procedures that would significantly improve the accuracy of the determintion without unduly impinging on the
achievement of legitimate state purposes. 29
Appellees argue, however, that the risk of erroneous and
unnecessary detentions is too high despite these procedures
because the standard for detention is fatally vague. Detention under § 320.5(3)(b) is based on a finding that there is a
"serious risk" that the juvenile, if released, would commit a
crime prior to his next court appearence. We have already
seen that detention of juveniles on that ground serves legitimate regulatory purposes. But appellees claim, and the district court agreed, that it is virtually impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy.
Moreover, they say, the statutory standard fails to channel
the discretion of the Family Court judge by specifying the
factors on which he should rely in making that prediction.
The procedural protections noted above are thus, in their
view, unavailing because the ultimate decision is intrinsically
arbitrary and uncontrolled.
Our cases indicate, however, that from a legal point of view
there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of
future criminal conduct. Such a judgment forms an impor29
Judge Newman, in his concurrence below, offered a list of statutory
improvements. These suggested changes included: limitations on the
crimes for which the juvenile has been arrested or which he is likely to
commit if released; a determination of the likelihood that the juvenile committed the crime; an assessment of the juvenile's background; and a more
specific standard of proof. The first and second of these suggestions have
already been considered. Seen. 18 and n. 27, supra. We need only add
to the discussion in n. 18 that there is no indication that delimiting the category of crimes justifying detention would improve the accuracy of the
§ 320.5(3)(b) determination in any respect. The third and forth suggestions are discussed in text, infra.
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tant element in many decisions, 80 and we have specifically rejected the contention, based on the same sort of sociological
data relied upon by appellees and the district court, "that it is
impossible to predict future behavior and that the question is
so vague as to be meaningless." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S.
262, 274 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ.); id., at 279 (WHITE, J., concurring).
We have also recognized that a prediction of future criminal conduct is "an experienced prediction based on a host of
variables" which cannot be readily codified. Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 16 (1979). Judge Quinones of the Family Court testifed at trial that he and his colleagues make a determination under § 320.5(3)(b) based on
numerous factors including the nature and seriousness of the
charges; whether the charges are likely to be proved at trial;
the juvenile's prior record; the adequacy and effectiveness of
his home supervision; his school situation, if known; the time
of day of the alleged crime as evidence of its seriousness and
a possible lack of parental control; and any special circumSee Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274-275 (1976) (death sentence imposed by jury); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 9-10
(1979) (grant of parole); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972) (parole revocation).
A prediction of future criminal conduct may also form the basis for an
increased sentence under the "dangerous special offender" statute, 18
U. S. C. § 3575 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Under§ 3575(0, a "dangerous" offender is defined as an individual for whom "a period of confinement longer
than that provided for such [underlying] felony is required for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant." The
statute has been challenged numerous times on the grounds that the standard is unconstitutionally vague. Every Court of Appeals considering the
question has rejected that claim. United States v. Davis, 710 F. 2d 104,
108-109 (CA3), cert. denied, U. S. (1983); United States v.
Schell, 692 F. 2d 672, 675-676 (CAl0 1982); United States v. Williamson,
567 F. 2d 610, 613 (CA4 1977); United States v. B<YWdach, 561 F. 2d 1160,
1175 (CA51977); United States v. Neary, 552 F. 2d 1184, 1194 (CA7), cert.
denied, 434 U. S. 864 (1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F. 2d 326,
336-337 (CA6), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 922 (1976).
30

82-1248 & 82-1278-0PINION

26

SCHALL v. MARTIN

stances that might be brought to his attention by the probation officer, the child's attorney, or any parents, relatives or
other responsible persons accompanying the child. Testimony of Judge Quinones, J. A., at 254-267. The decision is
based on as much information as can reasonably be obtained
at the initial appearance. Ibid.
Given the right to a hearing, to counsel and to a statement
of reasons, there is no reason that the specific factors upon
which the Family Court judge might rely must be specified in
the statute. As the New York Court of Appeals concluded,
People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 522
(1976), "to a very real extent Family Court must exercise a
substitute parental control for which there can be no particularized criteria." There is also no reason, we should add, for
a federal court to assume that a state court judge will not
strive to apply state law as conscientiously as possible.
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 549 (1981).
It is worth adding that the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was mistaken in its conclusion that "individual litigation ... is a practical impossibility because the periods of detention are so short that the litigation is mooted before the
merits are determined." 689 F. 2d, at 373. In fact, one of
the juveniles in the very case histories upon which the court
relied was released from pretrial detention on a writ of habeas corpus issued by the state Supreme Court. New York
courts also have adopted a liberal view of the doctrine of "capable of repetition, yet evading review" precisely in order to
ensure that pretrial detention orders are not unreviewable.
In People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518,
519-520 (1976), the court declined to dismiss an appeal from
the grant of a writ of habeas corpus despite the technical
mootness of the case.
"Because the situation is likely to recur ... and the substantial issue may otherwise never be reached (in view of
the predictably recurring happenstance that, however
expeditiously an appeal might be prosecuted, fact-find-
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ing and dispositional hearings normally will have been
held and a disposition made before the appeal could
reach us), ... we decline to dismiss [the appeal] on the
ground of mootness."
The required statement of facts and reasons justifying the
detention and the stenographic record of the initial appearance will provide a basis for the review of individual cases.
Pretrial detention orders in New York may be reviewed by
writ of habeas corpus brought in state Supreme Court. And
the judgment of that court is appealable as of right and may
be taken directly to the Court of Appeals if a constitutional
question is presented. N. Y. Civil Practice Law§ 5601(b)(2)
(1978). Permissive appeal from a Family Court order may
also be had to the appellate division. FCA § 365.2. Or a
motion for reconsideration may be directed to the Family
Court judge. Id., at § 355. l(l)(b). These postdetention
procedures provide a sufficient mechanism for correcting on a
case-by-case basis any erroneous detentions ordered under
§ 320.5(3). Such procedures may well flesh out the standards specified in the statute.

III
The question before us today is not whether a better preventive detention system could be devised, but only whether
this system, as applied by the New York Family Court, comports with constitutional standards. Given the regulatory
purpose for the detention and the procedural protections that
precede its imposition, we conclude that § 320.5(3)(b) of the
New York Family Court Act is not invalid under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

March 27, 1984
82-1248 and 82-1278 Schall v. Martin
Dear Bill:
I should have replied sooner to your letter of
March 20. ~lthough with the wedding activity in your family, you probably have not been concerned.
In considerinq further this case, I think it is
necessary to view it · - as plaintiffs do in their complaint as a facial challenge to the statute. If I am right about
this, the aoplication of the statute to the named plaintiffs
is irrelevant. I therefore suggest that the discussion of
these plaintiffs in Parts II and III(C) in your second draft
be omitted, or that reference to them be deemphasized, simply because this seems to weaken rather than strengthen a
holding that the atatute is facially valid.
In Part III(A) you do not mention the fact that on
its face the statute provid~s different standards for "pretrial" detention on the one hand and final disposition on
the other. CA2, relying on statistics that showed a disparity, thought this distinction was important because it suggested a punitive rationale. This is not a frivolous argument. Also as to Part III(B), the statistics are relevant
not to the question whether the procedures provided are adequate to minimize erroneous detentions. I think the answer as you suggest in Part III(C) - is the opinion of the New
York Court of ~ppeals in Schupf.. The broader answer, as we
have agreed, is the careful process provided by the New York
statute and the state's interest.
In your letter of March 20, you conclude~ by asking whether I would join you if the changes you suqgeste~
were made. Possibly I could, Bill, but - as indicated above
- I am not sure that. they would fully satisfy my concerns as
to the importance of meeting the statistical arguments head
on, and sustaining the facial validity of the statute without regard to the claims of the named plaintiffs.
Sincerely,

' Justice Rehnquist

lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 27, 1984

Re:

No. 82-1248

Schall v. Martin

Dear Chief, Byron, Harry, Lewis, and Sandra:
Some time ago I circulated the first draft of a
proposed Court opinion in this case, and the Chief and
Sandra joined it. Byron, Lewis, and Harry all of whom also
voted to reverse at Conference (with, as I recall it,
varying degrees of conviction} did not join. Last week
Lewis wrote me saying that he agreed with the result, but
that he did not agree with my emphasis on the "class action"
aspect of the case, and was inclined to simply treat the
merits of the constitutional claim and uphold the statute.
I communicated the substance of Lewis' comments to Byron and
Harry; Harry said he agreed with my account of Lewis'
comments, and Byron indicated that while he did not think he
had the same objections as Lewis did to the present draft,
he would not be averse to seeing the revisions which Lewis
suggested.
I have now pretty much gone back to the drawing boards
and, by reinterpreting the opinion of the Court of Appeals
in a way that I now feel is more faithful to the views of
that court, have produced a draft which almost entirely
dispenses with any treatment of the "class action" aspect of
the case and simply upholds the statute on the merits. I
had originally thought that the Court of Appeals reasoned
that because the statute was applied punitively as to some
juveniles, it was therefore invalid "on its face" as to all
juveniles. I have now come to think that the Court of
Appeals used the statistical evidence as to some of the
juveniles as a basis for concluding that the purpose of the
statute was not a legitimate nonpunitive one, and therefore
that the statute was unconstitutional under the reasoning of
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and Kenned~ v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). While I still disagree with
the result reached by the Court of Appeals, I no longer feel

I have reason to criticize the methodological approach taken
by that court.
Reviewing my highly impressionistic Conference notes,
it seems to me that both the Chief and Sandra were quite
willing to deal with the case on its merits across the
board, so they should not be dissatisfied with the revised
opinion, and I am hopeful that the revisions will make the
opinion more palatable to Byron, Harry, and Lewis.
Obviously any one of you can disabuse me of these notions,
but I want very much to have a Court opinion in this case if
I possibly can.
enclose a copy of the revised opinion. May I hear
from each of you at your convenience as to your reactions to
it?
I

Sincerel~~

The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice O'Connor

.in:prnnt QJO'ltrl of tlrt ~ .§ta:tu
Jkglfinghtn. ~. OJ. 2llffe'l'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 28, 1984

Re:

82-1248 and 82-1278 Schall v. Martin
Abrams v. Martin

Dear Bill,
I will join your third draft.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to:

cpm

The Chief Justice
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice O'Connor

/
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 28, 1984

No. 82-1248 Schall v. Martin
No. 82-1278 Abrams v. Martin

Dear

Bill,
I am still with you on the 3rd Draft.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist

Copies to the Conference

Jen U::S/28/84

,~
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From:

~--µ-

Joe

Re:

responds to substantially all of our concerns.

It

~J~~s

cussion of class actions almost entirely, responds ~

-

tiffs' statistical argument, at least in large part, and~

l~

a clearer invocation of the Mathews v. Eldridge analys ~ ~ ave
a few fairly minor suggestions, but essentially I

thi~ f j ,_?

ion is OK TO JOIN.
(1)
that

I note that the opinion still does not mention the fact

the

statute

appears

to prescribe different

pretrial detention and post-"trial" disposition.

standards

for

I do not think

the point is important in the long run, and I suspect that eventually WHR i l ll have t ~

eal with it in response to the dissent;
Thus,

there are several ready answers.
gesting any changes on this score;

I don't recommend sug-

I draw your attention to it

only because the disparity was mentioned in your letter to WHR of
March 28th.
(2)

I am concerned that the opinion still does not make clear
merely by way of analo-

gy.

pp.

There is langua

23-24 that suggests

the view that Gerstein establishes what procedures are "constitutionally adequate" for any pretrial action.

Of course, this view

is wrong under Mathews; the content of due process varies depending

on

the

circumstances,

and

the

circumstances

involved

Gerstein are significantly different from those here.

in

Gerstein

"/ L/

addressed the question of what procedures are necessary to determine whether a person committed a crime in the past; if probable
cause is found, the defendant may still be released on bail or on
personal recognizance.

The question here is what procedures are

necessary to determine whether a juvenile will commit a crime in
the future; if a serious risk is found, the juvenile is detained.
Thus, Gerstein is merely analogous authority, not controlling.
To make this clear,
page 21,

first

,r,

I would suggest three changes.

change the final sentence to read,

( i)

On

"Gerstein

arose under the Fourth Amendment and dealt with the question of
whether

the accused had committed a er ime in the past, but the

same concern with

'flexibility' and 'informality,' while yet en-

suring adequate predetention procedures,
(ii)

text."
read,

On page 21,

"In many respects,

final

,r,

is present in this con-

change the first sentence to

the Family Court Act provides far more

predetention protection for juveniles than we found to be constitutionally
Gerstein."
24, insert:

required
(iii)

to determine

probable

cause

for

adults

in

In place of the carryover sentence on pages 23-

"The question addressed in the initial appearance in

this case is closely analogous to the probable cause determination of Gerstein v.
are

Pugh.

constitutionally

States,

383 U.S.

541,

We conclude that the same procedures

adequate
557

here.

(1966) ."

See

also

Kent

v.

United

[Of course, much more might

be said on the topic of how closely analogous the probable cause
determination is to the determination of serious risk of future
crime, but these changes at least will ensure that this opinion
is not
seen as altering due process analysis.]
,

( 3)

Purely

by

way of

strengthening WHR' s

suggest that he mention the

fact

opinion,

I

would

that appellees have ci tea na-

tionwide studies purporting to show that across the country there
is a similar disparity between the number of juveniles detained
before trial and the number ultimately incarcerated that there is
in New York.

Appellees' Brief at 79-81.

This goes to the point

that New York's statute is not out of line with what other states
have viewed

as

acceptable.

The

place

I

would

put

footnote after the carryover sentence on pages 18-19.

it

is

as

a

March 2~, 1984
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Dear Bill:

Please ioin me.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/sa
cc:

'rhe Conference
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jlufri:nghnt. ~- ~- 211'.?ll'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 29, 1984

Re:

No. 82-1248 and 82-1279

Schall v. Martin

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Earlier this week I circulated a substantially changed
version of my earlier drafts in this case to those who had
voted to "reverse" at Conference, trying to find out if the
revised version had more appeal than the old one. Lewis and
Sandra have joined the new version and sent copies of their
join letters to the Conference~ Byron has joined but sent
copies only to those who received earlier copies of the
revised version. I now therefore withdraw the earlier
draft, and enclose copies of the third draft for those who
have not previously received them.
Sincerely,

iJJVv-

.h.prnru QJ01trl qf tlft 'Jmub !\tat.ts
-ulrittgton. ~. <If. 2llffe,.,
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 2, 1984
Re:

No. 82-1248)
82-1278)

Schall v. Martin
Abrams v. Martin

Dear Harry:
I will be happy to make the changes which you suggest,
and they will appear in my next circulation of this opinion.
Sincerely~

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

.§uµuutt <qonrt cf tlp~ ~ttilt~ jshtlts
~aglyin:gfott. ~- <q. 2llffe'!,
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

April 2, 1984

No. 82-1248) Schall v. Martin
No. 82-1278) Abrams v. Martin

Dear Bill:

' I\;•.• I.'

I 1 1,

j

J ;

Please join me in your third draft cir'culated March 27~ · :-1 ;·.,,. , :,
Sincerely,

J~

----

Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

): The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Marshall

Circulated:

MAY 2 3 1984

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 82-1248 AND 82-1278

ELLEN SCHALL, COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK
CITY DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
82-1248
v.
GREGORY MARTIN ET AL.
ROBERT ABRAMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF NEW YORK
V.
82-1278
GREGORY MARTIN ET AL.
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[May-, 1984]

JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
The New York Family Court Act governs the treatment of
persons between 7 and 16 years of age who are alleged to
have committed acts that, if committed by adults, would constitute crimes. 1 The Act contains two provisions that authorize the detention of juveniles arrested for offenses covered by the Act 2 for up to 17 days pending adjudication of
1
N. Y. Jud. Law §§ 301.2(1), 302.1(1) (McKinney 1983) [hereinafter
FCA]. Children over 13 accused of homicide and children over 14 accused
of kidnapping, arson, rape, or a few other serious crimes are exempted
from the coverage of the Act and instead are prosecuted as "juvenile offenders" in the adult criminal courts. N. Y. Penal Law § 10.00(18) (McKinney 1983-1984 Supp.). For the sake of simplicity, offenses covered by
the Family Court Act, as well as the more serious offenses enumerated
above, hereafter will be referred to generically as crimes.
2
Ironically, juveniles arrested for very serious offenses, see n. 1, supra,
are not subject to preventive detention under this or any other provision.
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their guilt. 3 Section 320.5(3)(a) empowers a judge of the
New York Family Court to order detention of a juvenile if he
finds "there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on the return date." Section 320.5(3)(b), the
provision at issue in these cases, authorizes detention if the
judge finds "there is a serious risk [the juvenile] may before
the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult
would constitute a crime." 4
There are few limitations on§ 320.5(3)(b). Detention need
not be predicated on a finding that there is probable cause to
believe the child committed the offense for which he was arrested. The provision applies to all juveniles, regardles13 of
their prior records or the severity of the offenses of which
they are accused. The provision is not limited to the prevention of dangerous crimes; a prediction that a juvenile if released may commit a minor misdemeanor is sufficient to justify his detention. Aside from the reference to "serious
risk," the requisite likelihood that the juvenile will misbehave
before his trial is not specified by the statute.
The Court today holds that preventive detention of a juvenile pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) does not violate the Due Process
8
Strictly speaking, "guilt" is never adjudicated under the Act; nor is the
juvenile ever given a trial. Rather, whether the juvenile committed the
offense is ascertained in a "fact-finding hearing." In most respects, however, such a hearing is the functional equivalent of an ordinary criminal
trial. For example, the juvenile is entitled to counsel and the state bears
the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile
committed the offense of which he is accused. See FCA §§ 341.2(1),
342.2(2); cf. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1
(1967) (establishing constitutional limitations on the form of such proceedings in recognition of the severity of their impact upon juveniles). For
convenience, the ensuing discussion will use the terminology associated
with adult criminal proceedings when describing the treatment of juveniles
in New York.
• At the time appellees first brought their suit, the pertinent portions of
FCA § 320.5(3) were embodied in FCA § 739(a). I agree with the majority
that the reenactment of the crucial provision under a different numerical
heading does not render the case moot. See ante, at 2, n. 2.
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Clause. Two rulings are essential to the Court's decision:
that the provision promotes legitimate government objectives important enough to justify the abridgment of the detained juveniles' liberty interests, ante, at 20; and that the
provision incorporates procedural safeguards sufficient to
prevent unnecessary or arbitrary impairment of constitutionally protected rights, ante, at 2~24, 26. Because I disagree
with both of those rulings, I dissent.

I
The District Court made detailed findings, which the Court
of Appeals left undisturbed, regarding the manner in which
§ 320.5(3)(b) is applied in practice. Unless clearly erroneous,
those findings are binding upon us, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
52(a), and must guide our analysis of the constitutional questions presented by these cases.
The first step in the process that leads to detention under
§ 320.5(3)(b) is known as "probation intake." A juvenile may
arrive at intake by one of three routes: he may be brought
there directly by an arresting officer; he may be detained for
a brief period after his arrest and then taken to intake; he
may be released upon arrest and directed to appear at a designated time. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 701
(SDNY 1981). The heart of the intake procedure is a 10 to
40-minute interview of the juvenile, the arresting officer, and
sometimes the juvenile's parent or guardian. The objectives
of the probation officer conducting the interview are to determine the nature of the offense the child may have committed
and to obtain some background information on him. Ibid.
On the basis of the information derived from the interview
and from an examination of the juvenile's record, the probation officer decides whether the case should be disposed of informally ("adjusted") or whether it should be referred to the
Family Court. If the latter, the officer makes an additional
recommendation regarding whether the juvenile should be
detained. "There do not appear to be any governing criteria
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which must be followed by the probation officer in choosing
between proposing detention or parole.... " Ibid.
The actual decision whether to detain a juvenile under
§ 320.5(3)(b) is made by a Family Court judge at what is
called an "initial appearance"-a brief hearing resembling an
arraignment. 6 513 F. Supp., at 702. The information on
which the judge makes his determination is very limited.
He has before him a "petition for delinquency'' prepared by a
state agency, charging the juvenile with an offense, accompanied with one or more affidavits attesting to the juvenile's involvement. Ordinarily the judge has in addition the written
report and recommendation of the probation officer. However, the probation officer who prepared the report rarely attends the hearing. 513 F. Supp., at 702. Nor is the complainant likely to appear. Consequently, "[o]ften there is no
one present with personal knowledge of what happened."
Ibid.
In the typical case, the judge appoints counsel for the juvenile at the time his case is called. Thus, the lawyer has no
opportunity to make an independent inquiry into the juvenile's background or character, and has only a few minutes to
prepare arguments on the child's behalf. 513 F. Supp., at
702, 708. The judge ordinarily does not interview the juvenile, 513 F. Supp., at 708, makes no inquiry into the truth of
allegations in the petition, 513 F. Supp., at 702, and does not
determine whether there is probable cause to believe the juvenile committed the offense. 6 The typical hearing lasts be• If the juvenile is detained upon arrest, this hearing must be held on the
next court day or within 72 hours, whichever comes first. FCA § 307.3(4).
"The majority admits that "the Family Court judge is not required to
make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance," but contends
that the juvenile has the option to challenge the sufficiency of the petition
for delinquency on the ground that it fails to establish probable cause.
Ante, at 22. None of the courts that have considered the constitutionality
of New York's preventive-detention system has suggested that a juvenile
has a statutory right to a probable-cause determination before he is detained. The provisions cited by the majority for its novel reading of the

82-1248 & 82-1278-DISSENT

SCHALL v. MARTIN

5

tween 5 and 15 minutes, and the judge renders his decision
immediately afterward. 513 F. Supp., at 702.
Neither the statute nor any other body of rules guides the
efforts of the judge to determine whether a given juvenile is
likely to commit a crime before his trial. In making detention decisions, "each judge must rely on his own subjective
judgment, based on the limited information available to him
at court intake and whatever personal standards he himself
has developed in exercising his discretionary authority under
the statute." Ibid. Family Court judges are not provided
information regarding the behavior of juveniles over whose
cases they have presided, so a judge has no way of refining
the standards he employs in making detention decisions.
513 F. Supp., at 712.
After examining a study of a sample of 34 cases in which
juveniles were detained under § 320.5(3)(b) 7 along with varistatute provide only shaky support for its contention. FCA § 315.1, which
empowers the juvenile to move to dismiss a petition lacking allegations sufficient to satisfy § 311.2, provides that "[a] motion to dismiss under this
section must be made within the time provided for in section 332.2:"
§ 332.2, in turn, provides that pretrial motions shall be made within 30 days
after the initial appearance and before the fact-finding hearing. If the juvenile has been detained, the judge is instructed to "hear and determine
pre-trial motions on an expedited basis," § 332.2(4), but is not required to
rule upon such motions peremptorily. In sum, the statutory scheme
seems to contemplate that a motion to dismiss a petition for lack of probable cause, accompanied with "supporting affidavits, exhibits and memoranda of law,"§ 332.2(2), would be filed sometime after the juvenile is detained under § 320.5(3)(b). And there is no reason to expect that the
ruling on such a motion would be rendered before the juvenile would in any
case be entitled to a probable cause hearing under § 325.1(2). That counsel
for a juvenile ordinarily is not even appointed until a few minutes prior to
the initial appearance, see supra, at - - , confirms this interpretation.
The lesson of this foray into the tangled provisions of the New York Family
Court Act is that this Court ought to adhere to its usual policy of relying
whenever possible for interpretation of a state statute upon courts better
acquainted with its terms and applications.
7
The majority refuses to consider the circumstances of these 34 cases,
dismissing them as unrepresentative and too few in number to constitute a
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ous statistical studies of pretrial detention of juveniles in
New York, 8 the District Court made findings regarding the
circumstances in which the provision habitually is invoked.
Three of those findings are especially germane to appellees'
challenge to the statute. First, a substantial number of
"first offenders" are detained pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b). For
example, 9 of the 34 juveniles in the sample had no prior contact with the Family Court before being detained and 23 had
no prior adjudications of delinquency. 513 F. Supp., at
695-700. Second, many juveniles are released-for periods
ranging from 5 days to several weeks-after their arrests
and are then detained under § 320.5(3)(b), despite the abvalid statistical sample, ante, at 18, n. 21, and focuses instead on the lurid
facts associated with the cases of the three named appellees. I cannot
agree that the sample is entitled to so little weight. There was uncontested testimony at trial to the effect that the 34 cases were typical. App.
128 (testimony of Steven Hiltz, an attorney with 8 and one half years of
experience before the Family Court). At no point in this litigation have
the appellants offered an alternative selection of instances in which
§ 320.5(3)(b) has been invoked. And most importantly, despite the fact
that the District Court relied heavily on the sample when assessing the
manner in which the statute is applied, see 513 F. Supp., at 695-700, appellants did not dispute before the Court of Appeals the representativeness of
the 34 cases, see 689 F. 2d, at 369, n. 19. When the defendants in a plaintiff class action challenge on appeal neither the certification of the class, see
ante, at 7, n. 10, nor the plaintiffs' depiction of the character of the class,
we ought to analyze the case as it comes to us and not try to construct a
new version of the facts on the basis of an independent and selective review
of the record.
8
As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, 689 F. 2d, at 369, n. 18, there
are defects in all of the available statistical studies. Most importantly,
none of the studies distinguishes persons detained under § 320.5(3)(a) from
persons detained under § 320.5(3)(b). However, these flaws did not disable the courts below from making meaningful-albeit rough-generalizations regarding the incidence of detention under the latter provision. Especially when conjoined with the sample of 34 cases submitted by
appellees, see n. 7, supra, the studies are sufficient to support the three
findings enumerated in the text. Even the majority, though it chastizes
appellees for failing to assemble better data, ante, at 18, and n. 21, does not
suggest that those findings are clearly erroneous.
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sence of any evidence of misconduct during the time between
their arrests and "initial appearances." Sixteen of the 34
cases in the sample fit this pattern. 513 F. Supp., at 705,
713-714. Third, "the overwhelming majority" of the juveniles detained under § 320.5(3)(b) are released either before
or immediately after their trials, either unconditionally or on
parole. 513 F. Supp., at 705. At least 23 of the juveniles in
the sample fell into this category. Martin v. Strasburg, 689
F. 2d 365, 369, n. 19 (CA2 1982); see 513 F. Supp., at
695-700.
Finally, the District Court made a few significant findings
concerning the conditions associated with "secure detention"
pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b). 9 In a "secure facility," "[t]he juveniles are subjected to strip-searches, wear institutional clothing and follow institutional regimen. At Spofford [Juvenile
Detention Center], which is a secure facility, some juveniles
who have had dispositional determinations and were awaiting
placement (long term care) comingle with those in pretrial
detention (short term care)." 513 F. Supp., at 695, n. 5.
It is against the backdrop of these findings that the contentions of the parties must be examined.

II
A

As the majority concedes, ante, at 9, the fact that
applies only to juveniles does not insulate the
provision from review under the Due Process Clause.
"[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone." In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967).
Examination of the provision must of course be informed by a
§ 320.5(3)(b)

The State director of detention services testified that, in 1978, approximately 6 times as many juveniles were admitted to "secure facilities"
as to "non-secure facilities." See 513 F. Supp., at 703, n. 8. These figures are not broken down as to persons detained under § 320.5(3)(a) and
persons detained under § 320.5(3)(b). There seems no dispute, however,
that most of the juveniles held under the latter provision are subjected to
"secure detention."
9
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recognition that juveniles have different needs and capacities
than adults, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528,
550 (1971), but the provision still "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment," Kent v. United
States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966).
To comport with "fundamental fairness,"§ 320.5(3)(b) must
satisfy two requirements. First, it must advance goals commensurate with the burdens it imposes on constitutionally
protected interests. Second, it must not punish the juveniles to whom it applies.
The majority only grudgingly and incompletely acknowledges the applicability of the first of these tests, but its grip
on the cases before us is undeniable. It is manifest that
§ 320.5(3)(b) impinges upon fundamental rights. If the "liberty'' protected by the Due Process Clause means anything,
it means freedom from physical restraint. Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673-674 (1977); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 572 (1972). Only a very important government interest can justify deprivation of liberty in this
basic sense. 10
The majority seeks to evade the force of this principle by
discounting the impact on a child of incarceration pursuant to
§ 320.5(3)(b). The curtailment of liberty consequent upon
detention of a juvenile, the majority contends, is mitigated
by the fact that "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some
This principle underlies prior decisions of the Court involving various
constitutional provisions as they relate to pretrial detention. In Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 113-114 (1975), we relied in part on the severity of
"[t]he consequences of prolonged detention" in construing the Fourth
Amendment to forbid pretrial incarceration of a suspect for an extended
period of time without "a judicial determination of probable cause." In
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1951), we stressed the importance of a
person's right to freedom until proven guilty in construing the Eighth
Amendment to proscribe the setting of bail "at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to" assure the presence of the accused at
trial. Cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 149-150, 153 (1979) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
10
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form of custody." Ante, at 11. In any event, the majority
argues, the conditions of confinement associated with "secure
detention" under § 320.5(3)(b) are not unduly burdensome.
Ante, at 17. These contentions enable the majority to suggest that § 320.5(3)(b) need only advance a "legitimate state
objective" to satisfy the strictures of the Due Process Clause.
Ante, at 3, 10, 20. 11
The majority's arguments do not survive scrutiny. Its
characterization of preventive detention as merely a transfer
of custody from a parent or guardian to the State is difficult
to take seriously. Surely there is a qualitative difference between imprisonment and the condition of being subject to the
supervision and control of an adult who has one's best interests at heart. And the majority's depiction of the nature of
confinement under § 320.5(3)(b) is insupportable on this
record. As noted above, the District Court found that secure detention ent~ls incarceration in a facility closely resembling a jail and that pretrial detainees are sometimes
mixed with juveniles who have been found to be delinquent.
Supra, at--. Evidence adduced at trial reinforces these
findings. For example, Judge Quinones, a Family Court
judge with 8 years of experience, described the conditions of
detention as follows:
"Then again, Juvenile Center, as much as we might
try, is not the most pleasant place in the world. If you
put them in detention, you are liable to be exposing
The phrase "legitimate governmental objective" appears at several
points in the opinion of the Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
e.g., id., at 538-539, and the majority may be relying implicitly on that
decision for the standard it applies in these cases. If so, the reliance is
misplaced. Wolfish was exclusively concerned with the constitutionality
of conditions of pretrial incarceration under circumstances in which the legitimacy of the incarceration itself was undisputed; the Court avoided any
discussion of the showing a state must make in order to justify pretrial detention in the first instance. See id., at 533-534, and n. 15. The standard
employed by the Court in Wolfish thus has no bearing on the problem before us.
11
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these youngsters to all sorts of things. They are liable
. to be exposed to assault, they are liable to be exposed to
sexual assaults. You are taking the risk of putting them
together with a youngster that might be much worse
than they, possibly might be, and it might have a bad effect in that respect." App. 270.
Many other observers of the circumstances of juvenile detention in New York have come to similar conclusions. 12
In short, fairly viewed, pretrial detention of a juvenile pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) gives rise to injuries comparable to
those associated with imprisonment of an adult. In both
situations, the detainee suffers stigmatization and severe
limitation of his freedom of movement. See In re Winship,
397 U. S. 358, 367 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U. S., at 27. Indeed, the impressionability of juveniles may make the experience of incarceration more injurious to them than to adults;
all too quickly juveniles subjected to preventive detention
come to see society at large as hostile and oppressive and to
see themselves as irremediably "delinquent." 13 Such serious
injuries to presumptively innocent persons-encompassing
the curtailment of their constitutional rights to liberty---<!an
be justified only by a weighty public interest that is substantially advanced by the statute. 14
12

All of the 34 juveniles in the sample were detained in Spofford Juvenile
Center, the detention facility for New York City. Numerous studies of
that facility have attested to its unsavory characteristics. See, e. g., Citizens Committee for Children of New York, Juvenile Detention Problems in
New York City (1970). Conditions in Spofford have been successfully
challenged on constitutional grounds (by a group of inmates of a different
type), see Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (SDNY 1973), but nevertheless remain grim, see Mayor's Task Force on Spofford: First Report v,
viii-ix, 20-21 (June 1978). Not surprisingly, a former New York City
Deputy Mayor for Criminal Justice, has averred that "Spofford is, in many
ways, indistinguishable from a prison." Exhibit 30 (Affidavit of Herbert
Sturz, June 29, 1978, § 6).
13
Cf. Aubry, The Nature, Scope and Significance of Pre-Trial Detention
of Juveniles in California, 1 Black L. J. 160, 164 (1971).
14
This standard might be refined in one of two ways. First, it might be
argued that, because § 320.5(3)(b) impinges upon "[l]iberty from bodily re-
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The applicability of the second of the two tests is admitted
even by the majority. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535
(1979), the Court held that an adult may not be punished
prior to determination that he is guilty of a crime. 15 The majority concedes, as it must, that this principle applies to juveniles. Ante, at 10, 15. Thus, if the only purpose substantially advanced by § 320.5(3)(b) is punishment, the provision
must be struck down.
For related reasons, § 320.5(3)(b) cannot satisfy either of
the requirements discussed above that together define "fundamental fairness" in the context of pretrial detention.

B
The State and the majority contend that § 320.5(3)(b) advances a pair of intertwined government objectives: "protecting the community from crime," ante, at 10, and "protecting a
juvenile from the consequences of his criminal activity," ante,
at 12. More specifically, the majority argues that detaining
a juvenile for a period of up to 17 days prior to his trial has
straint," which has long been "recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause," Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), the provision can pass constitutional muster only if it
promotes a "compelling" government interest. See People ex rel.
(1976)
Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y.2d 682, 687, 385 N. Y.S. 2d 518, (requiring a showing of a "compelling State interest" to uphold
§ 320.5(3)(b)); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1968). Alternatively, it might be argued that the comparitively brief period of incarceration permissible under the provision warrants a slight lowering of the constitutional bar. Applying the principle that the strength of the state
interest needed to legitimate a statute depends upon the degree to which
the statute encroaches upon fundamental rights, see Williams v. Illinois,
399 U. S. 235, 259-260, 262-263 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result), it might be held that an important-but not quite "compelling"-objective is necessary to sustain § 320.5(3)(b). In the present context, there
is no need to choose between these doctrinal options, because § 320.5(3)(b)
would fail either test.
16
See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-672 and n. 40,
673-674 (1977); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 112 (1969); Thompson
v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199, 206 (1960).
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two desirable effects: it protects society at large from the
crimes he might have committed during that period if released; and it protects the juvenile himself "both from potential physical injury which may be suffered when a victim
fights back or a policeman attempts to make an arrest and
from the downward spiral of criminal activity into which peer
pressure may lead the child." Ante, at 10-13.
Appellees and some amici argue that public purposes of
this sort can never justify incarceration of a person who has
not been adjudicated guilty of a crime, at least in the absence
of a determination that there exists probable cause to believe
he committed a criminal offense. 16 We need not reach that
categorial argument in these cases because, even if the purposes identified by the majority are conceded to be compelling, they are not sufficiently promoted by detention pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) to justify the concomitant impairment of
the juveniles' liberty interests. 17 To state the case more precisely, two circumstances in combination render § 320.5(3)(b)
invalid in toto: in the large majority of cases in which the provision is invoked, its asserted objectives are either not advanced at all or are only minimally promoted; and, as the provision is written and administered by the state· courts, the
cases in which its asserted ends are significantly advanced
cannot practicably be distinguished from the cases in which
they are not.
1
Both of the courts below concluded that only occasionally
and accidentally does pretrial detention of a juvenile under
§ 320.5(3)(b) prevent the commission of a crime. Three sub1
• Cf. Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38 (1968) (Chambers Opinion
of Black, J.) (questioning whether a defendant's dangerousness can ever
justify denial of bail).
17
An additional reason for not reaching appellees' categorical objection
to the purposes relied upon by the State is that the Court of Appeals did
not pass upon the validity of those objectives. See 689 F. 2d, at 372. We
are generally chary of deciding important constitutional questions not
reached by a lower court.
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sidiary findings undergird that conclusion. First, Family
Court judges are incapable of determining which of the juveniles who appear before them would commit offenses before
their trials if left at large and which would not. In part, this
incapacity derives from the limitations of current knowledge
concerning the dynamics of human behavior. On the basis of
evidence adduced at trial, supplemented by a thorough review of the secondary literature, see 513 F. Supp., at
708-712, and nn. 31-32, the District Court found that "no diagnostic tools have as yet been devised which enable even the
most highly trained criminologists to predict reliably which
juveniles will engage in violent crime." Id., at 708. The evidence supportive of this finding is overwhelming. 18 An independent impediment to identification of the defendants who
would misbehave if released is the paucity of data available at
an initial appearance. The judge must make his decision
whether to detain a juvenile on the basis of a set of allegations regarding the child's alleged offense, a cursory review
of his background and criminal record, and the recommendation of a probation officer who, in the typical case, has seen
the child only once. 513 F. Supp., at 712. In view of this
scarcity of relevant information, the District Court credited
See American Psychiatric Association, Task Force Report on the Clinical Aspects of Violent Individuals 28--30 (1974); Cocozza & Steadman, The
Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing
Evidence, 29 Rutgers L. Rev. 1084, 1094-1101 (1976); Cohen, Groth &
Siegel, The Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness, 24 Crime & Delinquency
28 (1976); Diamond, Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 439 (1974); Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the Dangerousness of"Normal" Criminal Defendants, 66 Va. L. Rev. 523, 542-544 (1980); Ennis &
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins In
the Courtroom, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 693 (1974); Schlessinger, The Prediction
of Dangerousness in Juveniles: A Replication, 24 Crime & Delinquency 40,
47 (1978); Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the Repetitively Violent Offender, 69 J. Crim. L. & C. 226, 229-231 (1978); Wenk,
Robinson & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted, 18 Crime & Delinquency
393, 401 (1972); Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 Harv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 289 (1971).
18
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the testimony of appellees' expert witness, who "stated that
he would be surprised if recommendations based on intake interviews were better than chance and assessed the judge's
subjective prognosis about the probability of future crime as
only 4% better than chance-virtually wholly unpredictable."
513 F. Supp., at 708. 19
Second, § 320.5(3)(b) is not limited to classes of juveniles
whose past conduct suggests that they are substantially more
likely than average juveniles to misbehave in the immediate
future. The provision authorizes the detention of persons
arrested for trivial offenses 20 and persons without any prior
The majority brushes aside the District Court's findings on these two
issues with the remark that "a prediction of future criminal conduct ...
forms an important element in many decisions, and we have specifically rejected the contention ... 'that it is impossible to predict future behavior
and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.' " Ante, at 24-25
(footnote and citation omitted). Whatever the merits of the decision~
upon which the majority relies, but cf., e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, - U. S. - - , - - (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), they do not control the problem before us. In each of the cases in which the Court has countenanced
reliance upon a prediction of future conduct in a decision-making process
impinging upon life or liberty, the affected person had already been convicted of a crime. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1
(1979) (grant of parole); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976) (death sentence); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation).
The constitutional limitations upon the kinds of factors that may be relied
on in making such decisions are significantly looser than those upon decision-making processes that abridge the liberty of presumptively innocent
persons. Cf. United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446 (1972) ("[A] trial
judge in the federal judicial system generally has wide discretion in determining what sentence to impose. . . .
[B]efore making that determination, a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the
source from which it may come.").
20
For example, Tyrone Parson, age 15, one of the members of the sample, was arrested for enticing others to play three-card monte. Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 18b. After being detained for 5 days under§ 320.5(3)(b), the petition against him was dismissed on the ground that "the alleged offense did
not come within the provisions of the penal law.'' 513 F. Supp., at
698-699.
19
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contacts with juvenile court. Even a finding that there is
probable cause to believe a juvenile committed the offense
with which he was charged is not a prerequisite to his detention. See supra, at - - . 21
Third, the courts below concluded that circumstances surrounding most of the cases in which § 320.5(3)(b) has been invoked strongly suggest that the detainee would not have
committed a crime during the period before his trial if he had
been released. In a significant proportion of the cases, the
juvenile had been released after his arrest and had not committed any reported crimes while at large, see supra, at--;
it is not apparent why a juvenile would be more likely to misbehave between his initial appearance and his trial than between his arrest and initial appearance. Even more telling
is the fact that "the vast majority'' of persons detained under
§ 320.5(3)(b) are released either before or immediately after
their trials. 698 F. 2d, at 369; see 513 F. Supp., at 705.
The inference is powerful that most detainees, when examined more carefully than at their initial appearances, are
deemed insufficiently dangerous to warrant futher
incarceration. 22
In contrast to the breadth of the coverage of the Family Court Act, the
District of Columbia adult preventive-detention statute that was upheld in
United States v. Edwards, 430 A. 2d 1321 (DC App. 1981), cert. denied,
445 U. S. 1022 (1982), authorizes detention only of persons charged with
one of a prescribed set of "dangerous crime[s]" or "crimes[s] of violence."
Prediction whether a given person will commit a crime in the future is
especially difficult when he has committed only minor crimes in the past.
Cf. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U. S. 222, 231 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting)
("No court can predict with confidence whether a misdemeanor defendant
is likely to become a recidivist.")
21
By contrast, under the District of Columbia statute, see n. 20, supra,
the judge is obliged before ordering detention to find, inter alia, a "substantial probability" that the defendant committed the serious crime for
which he was arrested. D. C. Code Ann. § 23-1322(b)(2)(C) (1981).
22
Both courts below made this inference. See 689 F. 2d, at 372; 513 F.
Supp., at 705. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the
statute, did not disagree with this explanation of the incidence of its appli-
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The rarity with which invocation of§ 320.5(3)(b) results in
detention of a juvenile who otherwise would have committed
a crime fatally undercuts the two public purposes assigned to
the statute by the State and the majority. The argument
that § 320.5(3)(b) serves "the State's 'parens patriae interest
in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,'" ante,
at 11 (citation omitted), now appears particularly hollow.
Most juveniles detained pursuant to the provision are not
benefitted thereby, because they would not have committed
crimes if left to their own devices (and thus would not have
been exposed to the risk of physical injury or the perils of the
cycle of recidivism, see ante, at 12). On the contrary, these
juveniles suffer several serious harms: deprivation of liberty,
stigmatization as "delinquent" or "dangerous," as well as impairment of their ability to prepare their legal defenses. 23
The benefits even to those few juveniles who would have
committed crimes if released are not unalloyed; the gains to
them are at least partially offset by the aforementioned injuries. In view of this configuration of benefits and harms, it
is not surprising that Judge Quinones repudiated the suggestion that detention under§ 320.5(3)(b) serves the interests of
the detainees. App. 269-270.
cation. People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y. 2d, at 690, 385
N. Y. S. 2d, a t - .
Release (before or after trial) of some of the juveniles detained under
§ 320.5(3)(b) may well be due to a different factor: the evidence against
them may be insufficient to support a finding of guilt. It is conceivable
that some of those persons are so crime-prone that they would have committed an offense if not detained. But even the majority does not suggest
that persons who could not be convicted of any crime may nevertheless be
imprisoned for the protection of themselves and the public.
23
See Testimony of Steven Hiltz, App. 130-134 (describing the detrimental effects of pretrial detention of a juvenile upon the preparation and
presentation of his defense); cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 533 (1972);
Bitter v. United States, 389 U. S. 15, 16-17 (1967) (per curiam); Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U. S., at 8; Miller, Preventive Detention-A Guide to the
Eradication of Individual Rights, 16 Howard L. J. 1, 15 (1970).
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The argument that § 320.5(3)(b) protects the welfare of the
community fares little better. Certainly the public reaps no
benefit from incarceration of the majority of the detainees
who would not have committed any crimes had they been released. Prevention of the minor offenses that would have
been committed by a small proportion of the persons detained
confers only a slight benefit on the community. 24 Only in occasional cases does incarceration of a juvenile pending his
trial serve to prevent a crime of violence and thereby significantly promote the public interest. Such an infrequent and
haphazard gain is insufficient to justify curtailment of the liberty interests of all the presumptively innocent juveniles who
would have obeyed the law pending their trials had they been
given the chance. 25
2

The majority seeks to deflect appellees' attack on the constitutionality of § 320.5(3)(b) by contending that they have
framed their argument too broadly. It is possible, the majority acknowledges, "that in some circumstances detention
of a juvenile [pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b)] would not pass constitutional muster. But the validity of those detentions must
24
Cf. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, 56 U. Va. L. Rev., at 381 ("[Under
a statute proposed by the Attorney General,] trivial property offenses may
be deemed sufficiently threatening to warrant preventive imprisonment.
No tenable concept of due process could condone a balance that gives so
little weight to the accused's interest in pretrial liberty.").
25
Some amici contend that a preventive-detention statute that, unlike
§ 320.5(3)(b), covered only specific categories of juveniles and embodied
stringent procedural safeguards would result in incarceration only of juveniles very likely to commit crimes of violence in the near future. It could
be argued that, even though such a statute would unavoidably result in detention of some juveniles who would not have committed any offense if released (because of the impossibility of reliably predicting the behavior of
individual persons, see supra, at--), the gains consequent upon the detention of the large proportion who would have committed crimes would be
sufficient to justify the injuries to the other detainees. To decide the cases
before us, we need not consider either the feasibility of such a scheme or its
constitutionality.
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be determined on a case-by-case basis." Ante, at 20; see
ante, at 15, n. 18. The majority thus implies that, even if
the Due Process Clause is violated by most detentions under
§ 320.5(3)(b) because those detainees would not have committed crimes if released, the statute nevertheless is not invalid
"on its face" because detention of those persons who would
have committed a serious crime comports with the Constitution. Separation of the properly detained juveniles from the
improperly detained juveniles must be achieved through
"case-by-case" adjudication.
There are some obvious practical impediments to adoption
of the majority's proposal. Because a juvenile may not be
incarcerated under § 320.5(3)(b) for more than 17 days, it
would be impracticable for a particular detainee to secure his
freedom by challenging the constitutional basis of his detention; by the time the suit could be considered, it would have
been rendered moot by the juvenile's release or long-term detention pursuant to a delinquency adjudication. 26 Nor could
211
The District Court, whose knowledge of New York procedural law
surely exceeds ours, concluded that "[t]he short span of pretrial detention
makes effective review impossible." 513 F. Supp., at 708, n. 29. The majority dismisses this finding, along with a comparable finding by the Court
· of Appeals, see 689 F. 2d, at 373, as "mistaken." Ante, at 26. But neither of the circumstances relied upon by the majority supports its confident
judgment on this point. That the New York courts suspended their usual
rules of mootness in order to consider an attack on the constitutionality of
the statute as a whole, see People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y. 2d,
at 686, 385 N. Y. S. 2d, at 519-520, in no way suggests that they would be
willing to do so if an individual detainee challenged the constitutionality of
§ 320.5(3)(b) as applied to him. The majority cites one case in which a detainee did obtain his release by securing a writ of habeas corpus. However, that case involved a juvenile who was not given a probable-cause
hearing within 6 days of his detention-a patent violation of the state statute. See 513 F. Supp., at 708. That a writ of habeas corpus could be
obtained on short notice to remedy a glaring statutory violation provides
no support for the majority's suggestion that individual detainees could effectively petition for release by challenging the constitutionality of their
detentions.
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an individual detainee avoid the problem of mootness by filing a suit for damages or for injunctive relief. This Court's
declaration that § 320.5(3)(b) is not unconstitutional on its
face would almost certainly preclude a finding that detention
of a juvenile pursuant to the statute violated any clearly established constitutional rights; in the absence of such a finding all state officials would be immune from liability in damages, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982). And,
under current doctrine pertaining to the standing of an individual victim of allegedly unconstitutional conduct to obtain
an injunction against repetition of that behavior, it is far from
clear that an individual detainee would be able to obtain an
equitable remedy. Compare INS v. Delgado, - - U.S.
- - , - - , n. 4 (1984), with City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
- u. s. - , - (1983).
But even if these practical difficulties could be surmounted,
the majority's proposal would be inadequate. Precisely because of the unreliability of any determinat1on whether a particular juvenile is likely to commit a crime between his arrest
and trial, see supra, at - - , no individual detainee would be
able to demonstrate that he would have abided by the law
had he b"een released. In other words, no configuration of
circumstances would enable a juvenile to establish that he fell
into the category of persons unconstitutionally detained
rather than the category constitutionally detained. 27 Thus,
to protect the rights of the majority of juveniles whose incarceration advances no legitimate state interest, § 320.5(3)(b)
must be held unconstitutional "on its face."
21
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Family Court judges,
when making findings justifying a detention pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b), do
not specify whether there is a risk that the juvenile would commit a serious
crime or whether there is a risk that he would commit a petty offense. A
finding of the latter sort should not be sufficient under the Due Process
Clause to justify a juvenile's detention. See supra, at - , and n. 24.
But a particular detainee has no way of ascertaining the grounds for his
incarceration.
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The :findings reviewed in the preceding section lend credence to the conclusion reached by the courts below:
§ 320.5(3)(b) "is utilized principally, not for preventive purposes, but to impose punishment for unadjudicated criminal
acts." 689 F. 2d, at 372; see 513 F. Supp., at 715-717.
The majority contends that, of the many factors we have
considered in trying to determine whether a particular sanction constitutes "punishment," see Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963), the most useful are
"whether an alternative purpose to which [the sanction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as- signed," ibid. (footnotes omitted). See ante, at 15-16. Assuming arguendo that this test is appropriate, but cf. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 u. s., at 564-565 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), it
requires affirmance in these cases. The alternative purpose
assigned by the State to § 320.5(3)(b) is the prevention of
crime by the detained juveniles. But, as has been shown,
that objective is advanced at best sporadically by the provision. Moreover, § 320.5(3)(b) frequently is invoked under
circumstances in which it is extremely unlikely that the juvenile in question would commit a crime while awaiting trial.
The most striking of these cases involve juveniles who have
been at large without mishap for a substantial period of time
prior to their initial appearances, see supra, at - - , and detainees who are adjudged delinquent and are nevertheless released into the community. In short, § 320.5(3)(b) as administered by the New York courts surely "appears excessive in
relation to" the putatively legitimate objectives assigned to
it.
The inference that§ 320.5(3)(b) is punitive in nature is supported by additional materials in the record. For example,
Judge Quinones and even appellants' counsel acknowledged

..
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that one of the reasons juveniles detained pursuant to
§ 320.5(3)(b) usually are released after the determination of
their guilt is that the judge decides that their pretrial detention constitutes sufficient punishment. 689 F. 2d, at
370-371, and nn. 27-28. Another Family Court judge admitted using "preventive detention" to punish one of the juveniles in the sample. 513 F. Supp., at 708. 28
In summary, application of the litmus test the Court traditionally has used to identify punitive sanctions supports the
finding of the lower courts that preventive detention under
§ 320.5(3)(b) consitutes punishment. Because punishment of
juveniles before adjudication of their guilt violates the Due
Process Clause, see supra, at - - , the provision cannot
stand.
III
If the record did not establish the impossibility, on the
basis of the evidence available to a Family Court judge at a
§ 320.5(3)(b) hearing, of reliably predicting whether a given
juvenile would commit a crime before his trial, and if the purposes relied upon by the State were promoted sufficiently to
justify the deprivations of liberty effected by the provision, I
would nevertheless strike down § 320.5(3)(b) because of the
absence of procedural safeguards in the provision. As Judge
Newman, concurring in the Court of Appeals observed,
"New York's statute is unconstitutional because it permits
liberty to be denied, prior to adjudication of guilt, in the exercise of unfettered discretion as to an issue of considerable uncertainty-likelihood of future criminal behavior." 689 F.
2d, at 375.
28
See Transcript of the initial appearance of Ramon Ramos, #1356/80,
Judge Heller presiding, Exhibit 42, p. 11:
"This business of being able to get guns, is now completely out of proportion. We are living in a jungle, and it is time that these youths that are
brought before the Court, know that they are in a Court, and that if these
allegations are true, that they are going to pay the penalty.
As for the reasons I just state[d] on the record , . . . I am remand[ing]
the respondent to the Commissioner of Juvenile Justice, secure detention."
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Appellees point out that§ 320.5(3)(b) lacks two crucial procedural constraints. First, a New York Family Court judge
is given no guidance regarding what kinds of evidence he
should consider or what weight he should accord different
sorts of material in deciding whether to detain a juvenile. 29
For example, there is no requirement in the statute that the
judge take into account the juvenile's background or current
living situation. Nor is a judge obliged to attach significance
to the nature of a juvenile's criminal record or the severity of
the crime for which he was arrested. 30 Second, § 320.5(3)(b)
does not specify how likely it must be that a juvenile will
commit a crime before his trial to warrant his detention.
The provision indicates only that there must be a "serious
risk" that he will commit an offense and does not prescribe
the standard of proof that should govern the judge's determination of that issue. 31
Not surp.risingly, in view of the lack of directions provided
by the statute, different judges have adopted different ways
of estimating the chances whether a juvenile will misbehave
in the near future. "Each judge follows his own individual
approach to [the detention] determination." 513 F. Supp.,
at 702; see App. 265 (testimony of Judge Quninones). This
29
The absence of any limitations on the sorts of reasons that may support
a determination that a child is likely to commit a crime if released means
that the statutory requirement that the judge state "reasons" on the
record, see ante, at 23, does not meaningfully constrain the decision-making process.
80
See 513 F. Supp., at 713:
''Whether the juvenile was a first offender with no prior conduct, whether
the court was advised that the juvenile was an obediant son or was needed
at home, whether probation intake recommended parole, the case histories
in this record disclose that it was not unusual for the court to discount
these considerations and order remand based on a 5 to 15 minute
evaluation."
31
Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 431-433 (1979) ("clear and convincing" proof constitutionally required to justify civil commitment to mental hospital).
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discretion exercised by Family Court judges in making detention decisions gives rise to two related constitutional problems. First, it creates an excessive risk that juveniles will
be detained "erroneously''-i. e., under circumstances in
which no public interest would be served by their incarceration. Second, it fosters arbitrariness and inequality in a decision-making process that impinges upon fundamental
rights.
A
One of the purposes of imposing procedural constraints on
decisions affecting life, liberty, or property is to reduce the
incidence of error. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67,
80--81 (1972). In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976),
the Court identified a complex of considerations that has
proven helpful in determining what protections are constitutionally required in particular contexts to achieve that end:
"[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id., at 335.
As Judge Newman recognized, 689 F. 2d, at 375--376, a review of these three factors in the context of New York's preventive detention scheme compels the conclusion that the
Due Process Clause is violated by § 320.5(3)(b) in its present
form. First, the private interest affected by a decision to
detain a juvenile is personal liberty. Unnecessary abridgment of such a fundamental right, see supra, at - - , should
be avoided if at all possible.
Second, there can be no dispute that there is a serious risk
under the present statute that a juvenile will be detained er-
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roneously-i. e., despite the fact that he would not commit a
crime if released. The findings of fact reviewed in the preceding sections make apparent that the vast majority of detentions pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) advance no state interest;
only rarely does the statute operate to prevent crime. See
supra, at - - . This high incidence of demonstrated error
should induce a reviewing court to exercise utmost care in ensuring that no procedures could be devised that would improve the accuracy of the decision-making process. Opportunities for improvement in the extant regime are apparent
even to a casual observer. Most obviously, some measure of
guidance to Family Court judges regarding the evidence they
should consider and the standard of proof they should use in
making their determinations would surely contribute to the
quality of their detention determinations. 32
The majority purports to see no value in such additional
safeguards, contending that activity of estimating the likelihood that a given juvenile will commit a crime in the near future involves subtle assessment of a host of variables, the
precise weight of wµich cannot be determined in advance.
Ante, at 2&-26. A review of the hearings that resulted in the
detention of the juveniles included in the sample o:f 34 cases
reveals the majority's depiction of the decision-making process to be hopelessly idealized. For example, the operative
32
Judge Newman, concurring below, pointed to three other protections
lacking in § 320.5(3)(b): "the statute places no limits on the crimes for which
the person subject to detention has been arrested ... , the judge ordering
detention is not required to make any evaluation of the degree of likelihood
that the person committed the crime of which he is accused[,] ... [and the
statute] places no limits on the type of crimes that the judge believes the
detained juvenile might commit if released." 689 F. 2d, at 377. In my
view, the absence of these constraints is most relevant to the question
whether the ends served by the statute can justify its broad reach, see
Part IIB, supra. However, as Judge Newman observed, they could also
be considered procedural flaws. Certainly, a narrowing of the categories
of persons covered by§ 320.5(3)(b), along the lines sketched by Judge Newman, would reduce the incidence of error in its application.
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portion of the initial appearance of Tyrone Parson, the threecard monte player, consisted of the following:
COURT OFFICER: Will you identify yourself.
TYRONE PARSON: Tyrone Parson, Age 15.
THE COURT: Miss Brown, how many times has Tyrone
been known to the Court?
MISS BROWN: Seven Times.
THE COURT: Remand the respondent.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 18a. 33
This kind of parody of reasoned decision-making would be
less likely to occur if judges were given more specific and
mandatory instructions regarding the information they
should consider and the manner in which they should assess
it.
Third and finally, the imposition of such constraints on the
deliberations of the Family Court judges would have no adverse effect on the State's interest in detaining dangerous juveniles and would give rise to insubstantial administrative
burdens. For example, a simple directive to Family Court
judges to state on the record the significance they give to the
seriousness of the offense of which a juvenile is accused and
to the nature of the juvenile's background would contribute
materially to the quality of the decision-making process without significantly increasing the duration of initial
appearances.
In summary, the three factors enumerated in Mathews in
combination incline overwhelmingly in favor of imposition of
more stringent constraints on detention determinations
under § 320.5(3)(b). Especially in view of the impracticability of correcting erroneous decisions .through judicial review,
38
Parson's case is not unique. The hearings accorded Juan Santiago and
Daniel Nelson, for example, though somewhat longer in duration, were
nearly as cavalier and undiscriminating. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 13a, 22a.
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see supra, at - - , the absence of meaningful procedural
safeguards in the provision renders it invalid. See Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 757, and n. 9 (1982).

B
A principle underlying many of our prior decisions in various doctrinal settings is that government officials may not be
accorded unfettered discretion in making decisions that impinge upon fundamental rights. Two concerns underlie this
principle: excessive discretion fosters inequality in the distribution of entitlements and harms, inequality which is especially troublesome when those benefits and burdens are
great; and .discretion can mask the use by officials of illegitimate criteria in allocating important goods and rights.
So, in striking down on vagueness grounds a vagrancy ordinance, we emphasized the "unfettered discretion it places
in the hands of the ... police." Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 168 (1972). Such flexibility was
deemed constitutionally offensive because it "permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the
law." Id., at 170. Partly for similar reasons, we have consistently held violative of the First Amendment ordinances
which make the ability to engage in constitutionally protected
speech "contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an officialas by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or
withheld in the discretion of such official." Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 322 (1958); accord Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 151, 153 (1969). Analogous considerations inform our understanding of the dictates
of the Due Process Clause. Concurring in the judgment in
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 (1978), striking down a
statute that conditioned the right to marry upon the satisfaction of child-support obligations, JUSTICE POWELL aptly
observed:
"Quite apart from any impact on the truly indigent, the
statute appears to 'confer upon [the judge] a license for
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arbitrary procedure,' in the determination of whether an
applicant's children are 'likely thereafter to become public charges.' A serious question of procedural due process is raised by this feature of standardless discretion,
particularly in light of the hazards of prediction in this
area." Id., at 402, n. 4 (quoting Kent v. United States,
383 u. s. 541, 553 (1966)).
The concerns that powered these decisions are strongly implicated by New York's preventive-detention scheme. The
effect of the lack of procedural safeguards constraining detention decisions under§ 320.5(3)(b) is that the liberty of a juvenile arrested even for a petty crime is dependent upon the
"caprice" of a Family Court judge. See 513 F. Supp., at 707.
The absence of meaningful guidelines creates opportunities
for judges to use illegitimate criteria when deciding whether
juveniles should be incarcerated pending their trials--:--for example, to detain children for the express purpose of punishing them. 34 Even the judges who strive conscientiously to
apply the law have little choice but to assess juveniles' dangerousness on the basis of whatever standards they deem appropriate. 35 The resultant variation in detention decisions
gives rise to a level of inequality in the deprivation of a fundamental right too great to be countenanced under the
Constitution.
IV
The majority acknowledges-indeed, founds much of its argument upon-the principle that a State has both the power
and the responsiblity to protect the interests of the children
within its jurisdiction. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S.,
at 766. Yet the majority today upholds a statute whose net
:w See

n. 28, supra.
See 513 F . Supp., at 708:
"It is clear that the judge decides on pretrial detention for a variety of reasons-as a means of protecting the community, as the policy of the judge to
remand, as an express punitive device, or because of the serious nature of
the charge[,] among others." (citations omitted)
36

82-1248 & 82-1278---DISSENT

28

SCHALL v. MARTIN

impact on the juveniles who come within its purview is overwhelmingly detrimental. Most persons detained under the
provision reap no benefit and suffer serious injuries thereby.
The welfare of only a minority of the detainees is even arguably enhanced. The inequity of this regime, combined with
the arbitrariness with which it is administered, are bound to
disillusion its victims regarding the virtues of our system of
criminal justice. I can see-and the majority has pointed
to-no public purpose advanced by the statute sufficient to
justify the harm it works.
I respectfully dissent.
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